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ARE WE REALLY OVER THE HILL YET? THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY YEARS: ACTUAL
AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN
THE WAKE OF ELECTION 2000 AND BUSH V. GORE
INTRODUCTION
Throngs of people stood in a steady drizzle on the night of Novem-
ber 7, 2000, staring intensely at the thirty-foot screens lining down-
town Nashville's War Memorial Plaza. Network anchors volleyed
conflicting election results while the Democratic Party faithful
cheered, sighed, and after a roaring speech by Gore Campaign Chair
William Daley, wrapped up the hours of hopeful waiting at 3:05 A.M.
as the Presidency hung in the balance.' As the confused crowds shuf-
fled off, their uncertain mumbles reverberated throughout the city.2
In the days that followed the 2000 presidential election, (Election
2000) reports of hanging chads, 3 pregnant chads, 4 dimpled chads,5 and
1. Kevin Sack & Frank Bruni, The 2000 Elections: Changing Circumstances: How Gore
Stopped on His Way to Concede, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at Al.
2. As Press Secretary and Communications Director for Jeff Clark, Tennessee's Democratic
U.S. Senate candidate, the author of this Comment had a front-row seat at the 2000 presidential
election (Election 2000) chaos. While I was an obviously invested actor in the election and the
Democratic Party's organization both statewide and nationally, I hope to answer with this Com-
ment the broader question of how close America is to reaching the voter equality envisioned by
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1975e (2000). Election 2000 presents a striking
illustration of the powers and passions roused by the right to vote for and elect our nation's
leader. Some may view Election 2000 as an absolute aberration. Yet others, this author in-
cluded, see the actual and constructive disenfranchisement in Election 2000 as finally bringing to
light the miscounting of votes along racial, economic, and political lines.
3. A hanging chad can result from voting on a Votomatic machine. On Votomatic computer
ballot cards, perforated squares, called "chads," mark the box for different candidates. See 2000
Florida Ballots Project: Votomatic Ballot Images at http://www.umich.edu/-nes/florida2000/bal-
lot/votomatic.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter 2000 Florida Ballots Project]. If a voter
fails to punch the perforated square completely, the chad will hang on the card. Id. To allow the
computer to read the cards, election workers must, and routinely do, remove the hanging chad to
count the vote. Id.
4. A pregnant chad is also the result of a Votomatic machine. Id. If a voter does not punch
through the ballot card forcefully enough to break the perforated square, then the chad will
appear to be expanded or "pregnant." Id. In the aftermath of Election 2000, much discussion
ensued as to whether a pregnant chad was actually a vote. Id.
5. A dimpled chad also occurs as the result of a Votomatic machine. See 2000 Florida Ballots
Project, supra note 3. If a voter punches the perforated box enough to create a point or a
"dimple" in the chad, then it is considered dimpled. Id. As with the pregnant chad, there was
great disagreement following Election 2000 as to whether a dimpled chad was indeed a vote. Id.
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out-dated mechanical voting machines flooded headlines. Questions
also surfaced regarding butterfly ballots and thousands of military ab-
sentee ballots-ballots that Republican Party officials single-handedly
waded through to correct and then count. 6
Meanwhile, buried on page two of papers nationwide were stories
of civil rights leader Jesse Jackson holding rallies and relating the ex-
periences of hundreds, possibly thousands, of African-American vot-
ers who were physically intimidated away from polling places,
required to show picture identification, and denied the right to vote,
while white voters were free to vote without identification. 7 Aside
from anecdotes of literal roadblocks,8 the statistical analysis of which
votes were counted and which votes were discarded is telling:
In the 2000 presidential election, African-Americans made up only
16 percent of the voting population in Florida but cast 54 percent of
the ballots rejected in automatic machine counts. Across the state,
automatic machines rejected 14.4 percent of the ballots cast by Afri-
can-Americans, but only 1.6 percent of the ballots cast by others.
Racial disparities appeared even when the same voting technology
was used. For example, counting machines rejected punch card bal-
lots in predominantly African-American precincts in Miami-Dade
County at twice the rate they rejected ballots in predominantly La-
tino precincts, and four times the rate they rejected ballots in
predominantly white precincts. 9
6. Scott Wyman, 19,120 Ballots Invalidated: Numerous Irregularities Chased Down in Florida:
Voters, Poll Workers Cite Problems That May Have Prevented Many from Voting, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 9, 2000, at 1A. See also ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION:
A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 151 (2001).
7. Wyman, supra note 6, at 1A. Derek Rose, Reno Must Probe Florida, Says Jackson, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 2000, at 40.
8. Peter Slevin & Serge F. Kovaleski, Outside Palm Beach, Complaints Growing; Democratic
Hot Line Collects 6,000 Reports of Problems Voting in Florida, WASH. POST, Nov. 11. 2000, at
A12. In the days following the election, the NAACP and several other African-American orga-
nizations said they had received hundreds of complaints from blacks who were reportedly turned
away at the polls even though they were properly registered. Id. Some complained that they
were harassed by law enforcement authorities at checkpoints set up in largely black areas as they
proceeded to polling places. Id. First-time Haitian voters were denied assistance in understand-
ing or translating the ballots in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. The NAACP filed com-
plaints with the Justice Department. Id. "We are hearing complaints about roadblocks in
Tallahassee, for example, in predominantly black communities to discourage blacks from voting.
And we are hearing here in Miami about Haitians and Cubans being accosted and people with
proper identification and registration who were denied the right to vote," reported Bishop
Victor T. Curry, president of the Miami-Dade branch of the NAACP. Id.
9. Spencer Overton, The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000: A
Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469-70 (2001)
(citations omitted). Professor Overton borrows his title from a line in Langston Hughes's fa-
mous poem, I, Too. Its poignant lines appear to be just as important today, although papered
over in more nuanced subtleties. Professor Overton begins his article with a telling homage to
Hughes: "I am the darker brother. They send me to eat in the kitchen when company comes
.... Tomorrow, I'll be at the table when company comes. Nobody'll dare say to me, 'Eat in the
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In the midst of this fracas, a cacophony of chants and sound bytes,
clamoring to "count every vote,"'10 "don't steal the election,"" and
that "some are determined to change the legitimate result,"'1 2 filled
nightly news stories, headlines, and eventually, legal briefs to the
United States Supreme Court.' 3 Aside from bruised, but burly parti-
san forces stirring up the messiest election in over 124 years,' 4 the real
issue on the table concerned the voting rights of United States citi-
zens. Election 2000 was a time of chaos and confusion while political
leaders and voters alike tried to figure out what went wrong-and
what was right. 15
As we pause at the cusp of the first presidential election after Bush
v. Gore,16 sandwiched between the Civil Rights anniversaries of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech' 7 and the Voting
kitchen,' then ... I, too, am America." Id. at 469 n.al (quoting Langston Hughes, 1, Too, in THE
NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE 1258 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. &
Nellie Y. McKay eds., 1997)).
10. "How can we teach our children that every vote counts if we are not willing to make a
good-faith effort to count every vote?" Sen. Joseph L Lieberman's Statement, WASH. POST, Nov.
27, 2000, at All (remarks of Senator Joseph Lieberman, Vice President Al Gore's running mate,
after Florida certified the state for George W. Bush).
11. Ceci Connolly, With New Resolve, Gore Returns to Capital: Team Renews Push for Presi-
dency, Slams Bush's Talk of Moving into White House, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2000, at A28.
12. Mike Allen, "I'm Going to Win," Bush Says: Recounts Called an "Effort to Change the
Legitimate Result," WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2000, at A21.
13. On November 22, 2000, Governor George W. Bush petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for writ of certiorari from the Florida Supreme Court's decision allowing a recount to
move forward. For a full chronology of the court battles that ensued after Election 2000, see
BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY, at xi-xiv. (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & Wil-
liam Kristol eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE COURT CASES].
14. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Scrap This System, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at A29 (referring to the
contested Hayes-Tilden Presidential election of 1876). For a detailed examination of the 1876
election crisis, see PAUL LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION OF 1876 (Russell & Russell 1966) (1906).
15. Political leaders and voters were not the only parties keenly watching Election 2000.
While "most of the scholarship and federal case law involving the political process prior to the
2000 election focused more on institutional arrangements than on the nuts-and-bolts of casting
votes and having them counted," after Election 2000, scholarship, analysis, and litigation soared
as injured parties, baffled scholars, and incredulous partisans tried to understand the chaos of
chads, undervotes, overvotes, and all the other mechanisms contributing to the disenfranchise-
ment. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at ii (2001).
16. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
17. Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech is perhaps the most well-known and oft-quoted ad-
dress he ever delivered. He gave this speech at the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963 as the
"keynote address of the March on Washington, D.C. for Civil Rights." See A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217 (James M.
Washington ed., 1991). The fortieth anniversary of Dr. King's famous speech was August 28,
2003.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:111
Rights Act,'8 the anticipation is palpable. Election 2000 poses a piv-
otal question: Are we really over the hill yet with regard to voting
rights or are there still mountains to climb? 19
In light of claims of actual and constructive disenfranchisement, did
Bush v. Gore correctly answer the voting rights outcry surrounding
Election 2000?20 Does it extend or at least carry on the rights of insu-
lar minorities2' who make up the class of citizens the Voting Rights
Act was meant to protect? 22
On the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the 1965 Vofing Rights
Act, this Comment seeks to determine if voting rights litigation and
legislation have accomplished the goal of the Voting Rights Act, or if
many challenges still lay in its path toward the goal of universal
franchise. Part II of this Comment will give a brief historical overview
of voting rights in the United States, the enactment and impact of the
Voting Rights Act and its subsequent litigation, and a summary of
Election 2000 and the circumstances that led the Supreme Court to
decide Bush v. Gore.23 While this Comment focuses primarily on sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act,24 specifically its remedial nature, an
explanation of the historical backdrop leading to its enactment and
the subsequent amendments are necessary to understand the full im-
plications and purpose of the legislation.25
18. Voting Rights Act. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (2000)). The Voting Rights Act is perhaps the most important federal statute that
overlays state and federal elections because it prohibits institutionalized structures and practices
that have the purpose or effect of disenfranchising or diluting the voting power of protected
groups. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
19. In the title of this Comment, "Over the Hill" has dual meanings. Much like adults reach-
ing the age of forty, the Voting Rights Act faces a possible midlife crisis. By contrast, the parallel
meaning resting in the title also evokes images of reaching the end of a journey and finally
making it over the hardest stretch.
20. See infra notes 230-272 and accompanying text.
21. The cornerstone of modern due process and equal protection analysis is the now-famous
phrase "discrete and insular minorities," used by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to delineate those
groups needing particular judicial protection. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. Id. See also infra notes 24, 33-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 110-170 and accompanying text.
24. The statutory basis for a voting rights claim is § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which simply
provides that:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner that re-
sults in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000)).
25. See infra notes 33-109 and accompanying text.
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Part III will analyze what Bush v. Gore has done for voting rights
jurisprudence. 26 Further, Part III will compare the evolving thread of
Voting Rights Act litigation with the new path that activists may fol-
low for the legislation in a post-Bush v. Gore era.27 Thus, the funda-
mental right to vote reestablished by the Court begins to revive
significant voting rights jurisprudence. 28 However, to create a full re-
vival, a reframing of the Voting Rights Act litigation thread is
necessary.
Finally, Part IV will proffer insight into the impact of both Bush v.
Gore and Election 2000 on future voting rights litigation. 29 It also will
discuss whether the snapshot of Election 2000 is indicative of a consis-
tent rate of voter disenfranchisement, 30 or if it demonstrates deeper
fractures within the United States electoral system.31 However, there
may be different challenges as voting rights supporters work to re-
frame and re-choreograph strategies for making every citizen's vote
count, regardless of a county's investment, or lack of investment, in
voting technology. This Comment posits that the Voting Rights Act,
as it nears its fortieth birthday, has been successful in many of its ini-
tial battles with actual disenfranchisement, but there are still many
miles to travel to achieve the goal of universal franchise. 32
II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT AND ELECTION 2000
The voting rights struggle for African-Americans and other disen-
franchised minorities consists of a long and turbulent history. The
Election 2000 crisis provides a vivid illustration of the realization of
voting rights just shy of the Voting Rights Act's fortieth birthday. This
section details some of the key historical developments in voting
rights as well as a brief summary of the remarkable events following
Election 2000.
26. See infra notes 230-271 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 272-279 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 280-294 and accompanying text.
30. The election crisis that Florida painted for the country illustrated and "exposed what has
long been the dark secret of the entire electoral process: significant inaccuracies and mistakes
infect the actual process of recording and tabulating votes." ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15,
at ii.
31. See infra notes 280-294 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
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A. Historical Overview of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
The right of United States citizens to vote, regardless of race, was
constitutionally established in 1870 with the Fifteenth Amendment. 33
However, it was not until almost a full century later that national and
universal suffrage became a reality and the actual law of the land.34
In direct response to the post-Civil War amendments, 35 the South
enacted a number of "legal and extralegal" reforms to limit the politi-
cal power of freed black men and to enable the Southern caste system
to continue. 36 Strategic tools were employed by segregationists to
keep the franchise away from African-Americans. Such methods of
discrimination included: district gerrymandering, purposeful closing of
black polling places, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and
above all else, waves of Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the form of lynch-
ings and vigilante violence against blacks and white civil rights activ-
ists in the South.37 The segregationists' efforts ensured that the right
to vote was a promise on paper rather than an actualization of civil
rights. Such extralegal maneuvers to rid southern society and its elec-
torate of equal racial representation became an acceptable and effec-
tive way to continue the South's racist caste system. 38
Obviously, given the southern segregationists' effort in disen-
franchising African-Americans, a vast disconnect existed between the
voting rights laws on the books and the actual ability of African-
Americans to vote. In the South, Jim Crow laws effectively kept Afri-
can-Americans from exercising their newly-derived constitutional
33. The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
34. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 256 (2000). Keyssar's entire volume illustrates the American struggle for
the right to vote. See generally id.
35. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery
and gives Congress the power to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the prohibition. U.S.
CONST. amend. XII1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides for the privileges and immunities to
extend to all citizens of the United States regardless of the state of residence, guarantees due
process, and equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment also provides for apportionment for federal representation based on the male population
of a state. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment gives male citizens the right to vote regardless of race,
color, or previous servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
36. See KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 105.
37. Id. at 105-27. See also JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 236-59 (1993).
38. See Mark Tushnet, The History and Future of Bush v. Gore, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
23 (2001). See also BASS, supra note 37, at 236-59.
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right to vote for nearly ninety years.39 Finally in the 1950's, partly due
to organizations such as the NAACP, labor unions, and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, African-American citizens engaged
in peaceful protests,40 bus boycotts, petitions, and lawsuits to chal-
lenge the law and culture of Jim Crow, which had flourished in the
Southern states.4'
The momentum for social and political change intensified after
Brown v. Board of Education,42 where the Supreme Court decided
that racially separate schools were inherently unequal. 43 The next
battle for national and community civil rights activists was to effectu-
ate the integration of schools and institutes of higher education.
44
Yet, key leaders were convinced that "the franchise was an important
right in itself and the key to securing other civil rights, [thus] hundreds
of thousands of African-Americans, acting alone and in organized re-
gistration drives, attempted to enter their names on registry lists and
participate in elections. ' 45 Many believed that once blacks were able
to vote in large numbers, the Jim Crow power structure, so ingrained
in Southern culture, would dissipate.46
Jim Crow did not disappear over night and social changes were not
easily implemented. The next ten years, 1955-1965, proved to be tur-
bulent and deadly for many activists and supporters of the civil rights
movement who worked to eradicate the deeply rooted caste system.
47
Further, the Court was not always a friend to universal enfranchise-
ment. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,48 for
example, the Court upheld a thinly veiled disenfranchising tool when
39. See KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 258. Shortly after the Civil War and Reconstruction, Jim
Crow laws were imposed in the South to enforce racial segregation in public places, educational
institutions, employment, housing, and transportation. Id. The laws lasted until the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s. Id.
40. It must be noted that while the civil rights movement began based on the tenets and
teachings of peaceful protest and civil disobedience, many protests indeed turned violent. See
KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 258. The actions of bystanders, counter-protesters, and even law
enforcement often caused what began as peaceful protests by civil rights activists to turn into
violent incidents. Id. For a detailed account of the civil rights movement, see JOHN LEwIs,
WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998).
41. See KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 258.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. See generally id.
44. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 228-52
(1998). See also JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
45. KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 256.
46. Id.
47. For a detailed discussion of the long road to enfranchisement for African-Americans. see
KEYSSAR, supra note 34. at 256-315.
48. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See also McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)
(holding that persons in jail awaiting trial had no right to an absentee ballot).
20041
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it ruled North Carolina's use of literacy tests was facially neutral, even
though such tests were widely known throughout the South as meth-
ods to keep African-Americans away from voting booths.49
Finally, by 1965, several appalling acts of terror5° served as a sharp
message to Washington that strong legislative steps were needed. The
trigger for President Johnson and Congressional leaders may have
been the murders of civil rights activists Michael Schwerner, Andrew
Goodman, and James Chaney in Philadelphia, Mississippi on June 16,
1964 by a white lynch mob,51 or the attack on peaceful protestors by
state troopers in Selma, Alabama on March 7, 1965.52 The disturbing
scenes erupting throughout the South persuaded President Johnson to
overcome the strong resistance by southern legislators against effec-
tive voting rights legislation.5 3 President Johnson called for strong
voting rights laws,54 and shortly thereafter, hearings commenced on
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.55
49. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 26.
50. On June 16, 1964, civil rights activists Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James
Chaney were murdered in Philadelphia, Mississippi. See generally FLORENCE MARS, WITNESS IN
PHILADELPHIA (1977). Many other disturbing and violent scenes erupted throughout the South
including attacks by Alabama state troopers on peaceful protesters in Selma. See BASS, supra
note 37, at 236-59.
51. See MARS, supra note 50, at 258.
52. See BAss, supra note 37, at 236-59. In many ways, Selma was the clearest illustration of
the intense and violent obstacles to political equality in the South. Id. at 236. Notwithstanding
litigation by the Justice Department and activism by civil rights groups,
Dallas County and its seat of government in Selma had become symbols of entrenched
opposition and brutal reaction .... Fewer than 400 of the 15,115 blacks of voting age
were registered to vote, and in the three previous months, registrars had accepted only
48 of 221 blacks who had applied .... We are going to bring a voting bill into being in
the streets of Selma," Martin Luther King, Jr., declared.
Id. at 236-37.
53. See United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, Introduc-
tion to Federal Voting Rights Laws, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/intro/intro-b.htm (last modified Feb. 11, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Justice].
54. President Lyndon B. Johnson noted with prescience, upon signing the Voting Rights Act,.
that he was delivering the South to the Republican Party. See JACK BASS & WALTER DE VRIES,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CONSE-
QUENCE SINCE 1945 (1976). See also Charlie Rose: Conversation with Gary Wills (PBS television
broadcast, Aug. 8, 2002).
55. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 229 (1991)
(quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech at the Presentation of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (Mar. 5, 1965)):
I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy .... At times
history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape a turning point in man's
unending search for freedom .... So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it was last
week in Selma, Alabama .... There is no constitutional issue here. The command of
the Constitution is plain. There is no moral issue. It is wrong ... to deny any of your
fellow Americans the right to vote .... This time, on this issue, there must be no delay,
no hesitation, and no compromise with our purpose .... What happened in Selma is
2004] ARE WE REALLY OVER THE HILL YET? 119
Congressional hearings determined that the anti-discrimination
laws, as of 1965, were not adequately addressing the intense opposi-
tion by certain states to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.5 6 Further,
the case-by-case litigation approach employed by many civil rights
groups like the NAACP proved to be slow and unsuccessful. 57 Each
time one discriminatory practice was declared "unconstitutional and
enjoined, a new one would fill its place and litigation would have to
commence anew."
'58
part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and state of America. It
is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of Ameri-
can life. Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it
is all of us who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice .... And...
we ... shall ... overcome.
Id. at 229.
56. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
57. See infra note 58.
58. Id. See also Chief Justice Warren's historical account of the slow progress surrounding
black enfranchisement in the South in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Chief
Justice Warren stated:
The Fifteenth Amendment . . . was ratified in 1870. Promptly thereafter Congress
passed the Enforcement Act of 1870, which made it a crime for public officers and
private persons to obstruct exercise of the right to vote .... [E]nforcement of the laws
became spotty and ineffective, and most of their provisions were repealed in 1894 ....
Meanwhile, beginning in 1890, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Car-
olina, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted tests still in use which were specifically
designed to prevent Negroes from voting. Typically, they made the ability to read and
- write a registration qualification .... These laws were based on the fact that as of 1890
in each of the named States, more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate
while less than one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write. At the
same time, alternate tests were prescribed in all of the named States to assure that
white illiterates would not be deprived of the franchise. These included grandfather
clauses, property qualifications, "good character" tests, and the requirement that regis-
trants "understand" or "interpret" certain matter.
The course of subsequent Fifteenth Amendment litigation in this Court demonstrates
the variety and persistence of these and similar institutions designed to deprive Ne-
groes of the right to vote ....
According to the evidence in recent Justice Department voting suits,... [discrimina-
tory enforcement of voting qualifications] is now the principal method used to bar Ne-
groes from the polls .... White applicants for registration have often been excused
altogether from the literacy and understanding tests or have been given easy versions,
have received extensive help from voting officials, and have been registered despite
serious errors in their answers. Negroes, on the other hand, have typically been re-
quired to pass difficult versions of all the tests .... The good-morals requirement is so
vague and subjective that it has constituted an open invitation to abuse at the hands of
voting officials ....
In recent years, Congress has repeatedly tried to cope with the problem by facilitat-
ing case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1957
authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctions against public and private interfer-
ence with the right to vote on racial grounds. Perfecting amendments in the Civil
Rights Act of 1960 permitted the joinder of States as parties defendant, gave the Attor-
ney General access to local voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in
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The Voting Rights Act was signed into law on August 6, 1965, by
President Johnson. 59 The chief provisions for remedial action were
contained in section 2 and section 5.60 Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act 6' enacted a nationwide prohibition of any denial or abridgment of
the right to vote based on race or color. 62 The legislation suspended
literacy tests and "provided for the appointment of federal examiners
(with the power to register qualified citizens to vote), in those jurisdic-
tions that were 'covered."' 63
Meanwhile, section 5 sought to ameliorate and monitor states (or
areas within certain states) that had a substantial history of racial dis-
crimination.64 The requirements of section 5 obliged covered jurisdic-
tions to obtain "preclearance" for the implementation of new voting
procedures. 65 Covered jurisdictions included states and areas of states
that historically discriminated in voting on the basis of race and/or had
areas of systematic discrimination. Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expedited the
hearing of voting cases before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used
to disqualify Negroes from voting in federal elections.
[This] legislation has proved ineffective for a number of reasons. Voting suits are
unusually onerous to prepare .... Litigation has been exceedingly slow .... Even when
favorable decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted
difficult new tests .... Alternatively, certain local officials have defined and evaded
court orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.
Id. at 310-14 (citations omitted).
59. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
60. Voting Rights Act, section 2 and section 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), 1973c (2000)).
61. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
62. Id.
63. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
[The 'covered' jurisdictions included] six Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia) and in many counties of North Carolina,
where voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election was less than 50
percent of the voting-age population. Under the terms of Section 5 of the Act, no vot-
ing changes were legally enforceable in these 'covered' jurisdictions until approved ei-
ther by a three-judge court in the District of Columbia or by the Attorney General of
the United States.
Id.
64. The jurisdictions covered under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
have a particular burden when redistricting. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2000). Preclearance is also required for the redistricting plans of noncovered states if the plans
apply to certain covered counties or other municipalities in the state that had a history of racial
discrimination or disenfranchisement. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999). Both for
covered states and covered counties or municipalities, the jurisdiction has the burden of proving
that the plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). See also Reno v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
65. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (2000).
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racist practices in local codes and laws leading to disenfranchisement
of African-American voters. 66 Either the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia or the United States Attorney General would ap-
prove the new voting practices for the covered jurisdictions. 67 The
purpose of section 5 was to prevent a covered jurisdiction from contin-
uing the practice of substituting new methods of discriminatory voting
practices for the previous laws that courts have invalidated as
unconstitutional. 68
When the Voting Rights Act was first adopted, only one-third of
voting age 69 African-Americans were registered in the "covered"
states compared to two-thirds of voting age whites. 70 As the Supreme
Court aptly stated in Katzenbach v. South Carolina,7' while upholding
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act:
Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to
combat wide-spread and persistent discrimination in voting, because
of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome
the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.
After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fif-
teenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advan-
tage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its
victims.
72
The Voting Rights Act, considered by some to be the most influen-
tial legislation passed by Congress in the twentieth century,7 3 is still
progressing toward the goal of equality and enfranchisement through
true universal suffrage.7 4 What necessarily follows, however, is the
66. Id.
67. See generally Reno, 528 U.S. 320.
68. See Brian L. Porto, Annotation, What Changes in Voting Practices or Procedures Must be
Precleared Under § 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965-Supreme Court Cases, 146 A.L.R. FED. 619
(2003).
69. It should be noted, however, that a statistical discrepancy exists because the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, in 1971, changed the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen years of age. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
70. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
71. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
72. Id. at 327-28. See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
73. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 5 (2003). See also PETER G.
RENSTROM, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 710 (1999) (explaining that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 is the most comprehensive piece of federal voting rights law, with substantial
impact on the balance between federal and state government).
74. See generally Sherilynn Ifill, Continuing to Build a Movement: Legal and Grassroots Strate-
gies, 43 How. L.J. 87 (1999) (outlining specific legal and political avenues for increasing the
franchise); Miles Rapoport & Jason Tarricone, Election Reform's Next Phase: A Broad Democ-
racy Agenda and the Need for a Movement, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 379 (2002).
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stirring reminder that political realities are often disconnected from
the lofty theories that spur such goals. 75
B. Weathering the Storm: Significant Challenges and Subsequent
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act survived challenges attempting to sidetrack
its effectiveness. While the Voting Rights Act did not include a provi-
sion barring poll taxes, it implicitly encouraged the Attorney General
to challenge their use.76 In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions,77 the Supreme Court held that Virginia's poll tax was unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 With Harper, the Court
held that definitions of who can participate in what elections, on what
terms, are subject to equal protection and due process review.79 Fur-
ther, after the Voting Rights Act passed, the Supreme Court issued
several key decisions upholding the constitutionality of section 5 and
affirmed the broad scale of voting practices requiring preclearance. 80
In 1970, Congress extended section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 8' for
another five years.82 In 1975, Congress again extended the
preclearance requirements of section 5 for seven years. 83 The exten-
sions by Congress in many ways endorsed the Supreme Court's expan-
75. Illustrating the disconnect between the political reality of enfranchisement and its theoret-
ical goals, Election 2000 was a needed wake-up call for political leaders and voters. With blatant
race-based exclusion to the ballot box as a relic of the past, many people assumed that the right
to vote was universal. The aftermath of Election 2000 certainly shattered such optimistic no-
tions. See generally A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter A BADLY
FLAWED ELECrION].
76. The Legislative Findings section of the Voting Rights Act expressly cited poll taxes as a
significant hurdle to the franchise that bore little reasonable relationship to any legitimate state
interest in the conduct of elections. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (2000). However, the statute reads:
If in a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General ... under any statute to enforce
the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any State or political
subdivision the court finds that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with
the effect of denying or abridging the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color,.., it shall suspend the use of tests and devices in such State
or political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate and for such period
as it deems necessary ....
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(b) (2000).
77. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
78. Id.
79. Id. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
80. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53. See also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969) (holding that gerrymandered districts and at-large elections could be used as tech-
niques to dilute minority voting strength).
81. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1975e (2000).
82. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
83. Id.
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sive interpretation of the preclearance requirements of section 5.84
The legislative hearings on the extension of section 5 illustrated the
many ways voting populations were manipulated through gerryman-
dering, annexations, adoption of at-large elections, and other struc-
tural changes to prevent newly-registered black voters from
effectively using the ballot.85 "New" forms of discrimination were
also moving into the political and legal landscape as Congress heard
extensive testimony from other groups subject to voting discrimina-
tion.86 Hispanic, Asian, and Native-American citizens also fell victim
to "new" as well as traditional voter disenfranchisement. 87 Thus, the
1975 amendments included voting safeguards for "minority-language
citizens." 88
In 1973, the Court recognized the effect of certain legislative multi-
member districts.89 The Court held in White v. Regester90 that multi-
member legislative districts were unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they sys-
tematically diluted the voting power of minority citizens.91 The deci-
sion served as a guide for litigation throughout the 1970s as minority
groups fought against at-large voting schemes and gerrymandered re-
districting plans.92 However, in 1980, the Court placed a roadblock in
front of the progressive line of voting rights jurisprudence. In Mobile
v. Bolden,93 a sharply divided Court changed directions and required
that constitutional claims under the White holding of minority vote
dilution 94 contain proof of a racially discriminatory purpose.95 This
newly-heightened requirement was widely seen as severely increasing
the plaintiff's burden. 96 While the case represented an emerging trend
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The author places the word "new" in quotations to recognize that other racial minorities
and ethnic groups have also experienced franchise discrimination for many years as well. How-
ever, Congress first legally recognized this phenomenon in the amendments to the Voting Rights
Act in 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2000).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. In multimember district elections, a number of candidates are elected from a large district,
often causing the dilution of a block of voters. See generally Lani Guinier, The Representation of
Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993).
90. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
91. Id.
92. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 53.
93. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
94. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
95. Id. at 66-68. Bolden garnered only a plurality of votes. Id.
96. For a further discussion, see Bolden, 446 U.S. at 103 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in the Court's view of equal protection claims, 97 Congress legislatively
removed the discriminatory purpose obstacle by quickly amending
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to allow a cognizable claim under
the Act with only a showing of discriminatory impact. 98
After extensive hearings on the practice and harm of minority vote
dilution, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982
and determined that the purpose of the Act was to remove barriers to
voting.99 Congress felt a response to the splintered vote in Bolden was
necessary. 100 Congress understood that a certain practice, while neu-
tral on its face, may have the result of denying minorities equal access
to the political process, regardless of the intent or motivation behind
the practice.10 1 As a result, to legislatively overcome Bolden,10 2 Con-
gress amended section 2.103 The 1982 amendments thus allowed
Bolden-like claims, which included factual findings of minority vote
dilution through such multi-member, at-large elections and other such
discriminatory districting techniques to stand based on a finding of
discriminatory impact on minority voters. l0 4
In the 1982 Amendments, Congress extended section 5 for another
twenty-five years.' 0 5 Congress also approved a new measure which in
1985 provided covered jurisdictions a way to terminate (or "bail out
from") coverage under the special provisions of sections 4 and 5.106
97. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding, in a suit alleging race discrim-
ination in police hiring, that a statute neutral on its face must be shown as invidiously discrimi-
nating on the basis of race to be unconstitutional); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (pointing out that respondents failed to prove that discriminatory
purpose was the motivating factor in zoning denial); Pers. Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(representing the newly-carved requisite burden of proof, which relies on the basic principle that
only if there is purposeful, intended discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1975e (1982). It is interesting to note, however, that
two years after Bolden, the Court decided Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), which held that
the county's at-large system of elections violated the Equal Protection Clause even without a
finding of explicit discriminatory intent. Meanwhile, Rogers hardly addressed or distinguished
Bolden, much to the dismay of its dissenter. Id. at 628 (Powell, J., dissenting).
99. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1975e (1982).
100. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
101. See Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning
the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715 (1983). See also Andrew Miller & Mark Packman,
Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY
L.J. 1 (1987); Rodolfo de la Garza & Louis Desipio, Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and
Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Cover-
age, 71 TEX L. REV. 1479 (1993).
102. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66-68.
103. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1975e (1982).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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The vast majority of Voting Rights Act litigation has centered around
three areas: redistricting to increase minority representation in legisla-
tures (with challenges to racial gerrymandering in favor of the histori-
cally discriminated minority dominating modern arguments);107
battling minority vote dilution; 10 8 and jurisdictional challenges to the
preclearance requirements under section 5 of the Act for states with a
discriminatory history in voting. 10 9 Breaking from the typical
claims-possibly because the situation at hand was far from typical-
were the Bush v. Gore voting rights challenges. While staged on many
fronts, including political, public relations and, of course, legal, the
strategies employed for securing the franchise in the aftermath of
Election 2000 had a blitzkrieg quality to them. Neither candidate
knew exactly where any argument might get him-but they tried
every angle and the foreshadowing for voting rights was of an oxy-
moronic quality; who could have imagined that the disenfranchise-
ment of thousands of voters might lead to greater franchise and even a
renaissance-of-sorts for the Voting Rights Act?
C. Brief Summary of Election 2000 and Its Aftermath
While many tomes have been written about the myriad of issues
involved in Election 2000 and the subsequent litigation, the following
section will give only a brief synopsis of Election 2000 and its
aftermath.
107. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that legislative redistricting plans
based "predominantly on race" will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that the redistricting was so bizarre on its face that it was inexplica-
ble on grounds other than race and therefore could not be upheld unless it was narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding that under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Department of Justice lacked statutory authority to re-
quire creation of majority-minority districts whenever possible; holding that even assuming com-
pliance with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling governmental interest, the redistricting plan
did not survive strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996) (declaring the congressional districts unconstitutional because race was the predominant
factor in drawing each of the districts).
108. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that the county's at-large system of elec-
tions violated the constitutional rights of its African-American citizens by diluting appellees'
voting power and excluding them from the political process). It is interesting to note that Rog-
ers, decided between Bolden and the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, affirmed the
lower court's holding of a racially invidious purpose without overruling Bolden. See generally id.
109. For a comprehensive discussion of these "three generations" of Voting Rights Act cases,
see Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup.
CT. REV. 245.
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1. Allegations of Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement
The aftermath of Election 2000 was a time of political chaos and
disorder as the nation's eyes turned to Florida to determine which
candidate received more votes in the electoral college, and thus, won
the Presidency. 110 Since the election in Florida was so close, with less
than one half of one percent separating the candidates,11' Florida
election law mandated an automatic recount.1 2 The recount revealed
across-the-board voting irregularities. 1 3 Indeed, stark racial dispari-
ties emerged as well, in terms of whose votes were more likely not to
be counted.11 4
In such a perplexing and extraordinary time, with Texas Governor
George Bush leading the popular vote in Florida with 2,909,135 votes,
and Vice President Al Gore less than 2,000 votes behind at 2,907,351,
both campaigns struggled to craft the best strategy to reach the requi-
site number of popular votes to then capture Florida's twenty-five
electoral votes." 5 Further obstacles lay in the path, however, as more
and more claims of disenfranchisement and illegal maneuvers during
Florida's election came to the surface." 16
For example, Palm Beach County employed a butterfly ballot as its
voting mechanism of choice." 7 However, the butterfly ballot had a
number of design flaws causing many scholars and observers to con-
clude that thousands of votes had been miscast." 8 A community
known for a heavily Jewish population, with a significant number of
Holocaust survivors among its residents,11 9 Palm Beach had a final
110. See Sack & Bruni, supra note 1, at Al.
111. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-01.
112. The automatic recount was conducted pursuant to Florida election code § 102.141(4).
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 101. While such a proposition sounds relatively simple, irregularities be-
tween counties happen quite regularly as each municipality has the freedom to design the electo-
ral mechanisms as the municipality sees fit. See FLA STAT. ch. 102.141(4) (2003).
113. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
114. See Overton, supra note 9, at 170.
115. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-01.
116. As noted earlier, many claims of disenfranchisement fell along racial and economic lines.
See supra notes 8-9. The NAACP and other civil rights organizations received thousands of
phone calls detailing actual disenfranchisement in voting. Id.
117. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BAT-
TLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 137 (2001).
118. Id. at 139.
119. As the author of this Comment has noted elsewhere, Jewish-Americans have overwhelm-
ingly voted Democratic in every Presidential election since the 1940s. See Karyn L. Bass, Be-
yond Dollars and Sense: The Partisanship of White Blue-Collar Workers and Jewish-Americans,
(2000) (unpublished senior honors thesis, Northwestern University) (on file with the author,
Northwestern University library, and Northwestern University Department of Political Science).
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tally for Pat Buchanan higher than any other county in the state.120 In
fact, twenty percent of Buchanan's statewide total came from Palm
Beach County.121 Further perplexing the situation was that many
Palm Beach voters saw Pat Buchanan, the right-wing third party can-
didate, as an anti-Semite. 22
Upon returning home to watch the election coverage on the news,
many Palm Beach voters realized they had mistakenly voted for Pat
Buchanan instead of Vice President Al Gore.123 Buchanan had his
strongest showing in Palm Beach in the precincts where Gore also had
his strongest showing, adding to the contentions that Gore voters mis-
takenly voted for Buchanan. 124 Indeed, one statistician argued that
the chances the data would converge in this matter by accident or
chance are less than one in one trillion.125 From the conflicting signs
of voter intent and the apparent voter and systemic error, it is "hard
to avoid the conclusion that the confusing butterfly ballot caused at
least a few thousand Palm Beach voters who wanted to vote for Gore
to vote instead for Buchanan by mistake. The number is certainly
higher than 537, which is the margin by which Bush eventually won
Florida."126
Complicating the election fiasco even further in Palm Beach was
the presence of 19,120 double-punched ballots. 127 The overvote rate
in Palm Beach was much higher than other counties: "4.1 percent of
all Palm Beach ballots were overvotes for the presidential race, com-
pared with 2.7 percent in Miami-Dade County and 1.7 percent in
Broward County."'1 28 A few days after the election, voters in Palm
Beach County brought suit to demand a new county-wide vote for
President because confusing butterfly ballots resulted in mistaken
votes for Buchanan. 129 While the arguments were strong for declaring
the butterfly ballot illegal, the trial court felt it could not "unring the
120. See GREENE, supra note 117, at 139.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing CNN Live Event/Special, David S. Lee, University of California/Berkeley
(transcript 11/10/00)).
126. GREENE, supra note 117, at 139.
127. Double-punched ballots, also known as overvotes, are ballots on which a voter punched
holes for two presidential candidates. Id.
128. Id. (footnotes omitted).
129. Id.
2004]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
bell. ' 130 Consequently, the Palm Beach lawsuits did little to vindicate
the voters' rights to cast a valid vote in Election 2000.131
Closely following the revelations in Palm Beach were allegations of
constructive disenfranchisement due to certain voting technology used
in various counties. The impact of the different voting mechanisms
was along racial lines.1 32
Aside from the constructive disenfranchisement in the concentra-
tion of voting irregularities and throw-away votes along racial lines,
actual disenfranchisement of African-Americans occurred in the form
of road blocks, 133 refusal to verify voting registration, 134 and denial of
the franchise to individuals whose names matched or were similar to
the names of ex-felons, 35 who in fact were not ex-felons. 136 The ac-
tual disenfranchisement claims in Florida were reminiscent of the Jim
Crow era.' 37 Some citizens were barred from voting at the polling
places for discrepancies in their registration.138 Election officials at
central offices were nowhere to be found, and affidavits, typically
needed by voters to prove residency or registration, were in short sup-
ply. 139 Further examples of such problems included citizens with
"voter registration cards being turned away because their names were
not on the voter lists, polling places being moved without notice, votes
130. Id. at 141.
131. Id.
132. While the counties necessarily were divided along geographic lines, the disparate impact
of voter success fell along racial lines often because of the economic, social, and racial factors
determining where a concentration of people live. See Overton, supra note 9, at 469-70, and
accompanying text.
133. See Slevin & Kovaleski, supra note 8, at A12.
134. See Wyman, supra note 6, at 1A.
135. See Slevin & Kovaleski, supra note 8, at A12. See also Bob Herbert, Keep Them Out!,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A39. After the election, the lists revealed questionable connections
of the Republican Party and ChoicePoint, a company hired to "scrub" Florida's voter registra-
tion rolls. Id. It turned out that the lists were filled with errors, often disqualifying voters con-
victed of misdemeanors, but not felonies. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 33-109 and accompanying text.
138. See Slevin & Kovaleski, supra note 8, at A12.
139. See Wyman, supra note 6, at 1A. Specifically,
[i]n Broward County, many of the irregularities involve people being turned away from
the polls. Not just Democratic activists, but top county officials and precinct poll work-
ers report vast problems because the main elections office was unavailable to address
basic issues, such as changes of address, and thus people could not vote.
Janis Hernandez, a poll watcher in Pembroke Pines, said at least 50 people were turned
away at Sunshine Elementary School because their names did not appear on the books.
Lou Reskin, a North Lauderdale poll worker, said he turned away at least 50 people
because he could not reach the main office to verify voter registration information.
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being cast incorrectly because of ballot problems, and non-American
citizens [somehow] allowed to vote. 140
Meanwhile, constructive disenfranchisement of non-minority voters
amplified the election crisis as reports of as many as 6,686 valid ballots
in Broward County alone were discarded and not read by the voting
machine because voters failed to completely punch the hole next to
their candidate choices.1 4 1 As a result, these ballots were left with a
tiny piece of paper covering the hole, known as a chad, 142 still clinging
to the ballot. The machine could not read that a vote was cast. 143
Some argued that the human eye would be able to determine the
voter's intention. 144  In other cases, ballots were discarded by ma-
chines because the sides of the ballots were mangled or unable to be
inserted into voting machines properly. 45 Thus, with only 327 votes
at that time separating the two presidential candidates 46 in their race
to Florida's twenty-five electoral votes, every vote truly did matter.147
The ensuing five weeks after election day 148 included a whirlwind of
partisan battles to begin ballot recounting, lawsuits to stop the re-
counting, appeals to the Florida Supreme Court to interpret the "By-
zantine"1 49 Florida election laws and eventual appeals to the United
States Supreme Court to sort through the mess. 150 Bush's post-elec-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See 2000 Florida Ballots Project, supra note 3, at Al.
143. Some machines could not adequately process thousands of ballots because of
"overvotes" and "undervotes." Sack & Bruni, supra note 1, at Al. Overvoting occurs when a
voter mistakenly punches through the ballot for more than one candidate per office. Id. Un-
dervoting occurs when a voter either purposely or mistakenly does not punch through the ballot
for a particular office. Id. The election machinery in many of Florida's counties could not ade-
quately compensate for these abnormalities in the ballots and therefore effectively threw out
thousands of votes in the initial election night count. Id. The situation of machine error led to
the now-infamous pictures of Florida election officials holding ballots up to the light to ascertain
the voters intent. Id.
144. David Firestone, Counting the Vote: The Democrats' Tactics; Democrats' Eyes on Re-
counts and Courts, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 11, 2000, at Al.
145. Id.
146. Id. As reported, the numbers for the "National Popular Vote" were: Al Gore:
49,244,746; George W. Bush: 49,026,305; Gore's Lead: 218,441. Id. In the Florida recount, the
numbers were George W. Bush: 2,910,198; Al Gore: 2,909,871, Bush's Lead: 327. Id.
147. The actual breakdown of the final electoral college vote was: Bush 271, Gore 266. THE
COURT CASES, supra note 13, at xiv.
148. For the sake of brevity and focus, the author has decided not to include a complete
chronology of the myriad of legal filings and posturing during the post-election fracas. For a
collection of chronological briefs, court opinions, and commentary surrounding the aftermath of
Election 2000, see THE COURT CASES, supra note 13.
149. See Firestone, supra note 144, at Al.
150. Linda Greenhouse, Bush Prevails; By Single Vote, Justices End Recount, Blocking Gore
After 5-Week Struggle, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
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tion campaign lawyer, former Secretary of State James Baker, pro-
fessed, "[i]t is a sad day for America and the Constitution when a
court decides the outcome of an election. '151 Indeed, for the first time
in United States history, the Supreme Court decided the presidential
election. 152
2. On to the Supreme Court
As the presidency hung in the balance, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to answer questions of law regarding the constitutional is-
sues raised by the Florida election crisis. 153 This section offers a brief
discussion of why the Court's decision was widely criticized as being
both incongruent with equal protection jurisprudence and politically
motivated.1 54 Indeed, even scholars who support the Court's decision
in Bush v. Gore do not embrace the entirety of its analytical underpin-
nings. 155 Finally, this section will briefly summarize how Bush v. Gore
has been applied by lower courts to voting rights cases in its wake. 156
151. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION
2000, at 14 (2001).
152. For the first time in history, the United States Supreme Court cast the final vote for the
Presidency. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 54.
153. The petition for certiorari raised the following Constitutional questions: "whether the
Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential election contests,
thereby violating Art. II, § 1, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3
U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses." Bush, 531 U.S. at 103. Some scholars, however, feel that the Su-
preme Court in agreeing to hear Bush v. Gore caused even more constitutional issues to arise.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093
(2001). See also Bush, 531 U.S. 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had no
business deciding the case and should have left the resolution to Congress pursuant to the Elec-
toral Count Act of 1887, 3 U.S.C §§ 5, 6, and 15, which state that Congress is the primary body
authorized to resolve remaining disputes).
154. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable
Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT 77 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE VOTE] (explaining that the "newest equal protection," un-
like its forbearer, is far more attentive to the interests of individuals capable of protecting their
interests within the larger political process); Laurence H. Tribe, Freeing eroG v. hsuB From its
Hall of Mirrors, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION, supra note 75 (discussing, among other issues,
how the Court's decision was politically-motivated). Tribe, however, was Vice President Gore's
attorney before the Supreme Court.
155. See Richard Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Out-
come in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 13; Richard Posner, Bush v.
Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 165; RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS
(2001).
156. See Steven Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore into a
Vehicle for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 357 (2002).
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a. Bush v. Gore
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Florida election-
turned legal battle, in Gore v. Harris,157 which the Court decided in
Bush v. Gore, it certified two questions for judicial clarification:
"Whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for
resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1,
cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3
U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts vio-
lates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses."'1 58
The Court held that the standardless manual recounts constituted a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 159 The majority per curiam
opinion ruled that the recount procedures enacted by the Florida Su-
preme Court were inconsistent with the minimum procedures necess-
ary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the instance of a
statewide recount. 160 By viewing the rights implicated in Bush v. Gore
as not only highly fundamental, but proclaiming that such violations
raised the controversy to constitutional levels, the Court treaded into
new territory. 161 In fact, many believe the Court possibly opened a
Pandora's box of new voting rights jurisprudence. 162
157. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). For an excellent timeline of the numerous
cases that ensued after Election Day 2000, see THE COURT CASES, supra note 13.
158. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
159. Id. The Court was particularly concerned about the differences in recount standards
among the Florida counties. Id. at 101-03.
160. Id. at 105.
161. In fact, it is well-established and important to remember that every election irregularity
does not give rise to a sufficient federal interest or constitutional violation. See, e.g., Is-
SACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 3-5 (citing Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980))
(holding that no equal protection violation occurred in a local school board election with several
technical mishaps because unlike systematically discriminatory laws, isolated events that ad-
versely affect individuals are not presumed to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
See also Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that because the business of
conducting elections is often dependent on volunteers and recruits, conditions, errors, and irreg-
ularities vary widely and no constitutional guarantee exists to remedy them, thus state election
laws must be relied upon to provide the proper remedy); Pettengill v. Putnam County Sch. Dist.,
472 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that federal courts are not the "arbiter of disputes" that
arise in elections and absent aggravating factors such as denial of the vote on grounds of race or
fraudulent interference with a free election, no federal violation exists with an alleged improper
counting of ballots).
162. See Cass Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 205. Sunstein
explains that while the equal protection holding is appealing, it had no basis in precedent or
history. Id. at 207. Sunstein argues that coming from the notoriously minimalist Rehnquist
Court, a Court that derives its minimalist views from its conception of a limited role of the
federal judiciary, the Bush majority is astounding. Id. at 205. In a sense, the Pandora's box of
voting rights jurisprudence which the Rehnquist Court has opened in Bush could lead the way
for a flood of equal protection arguments based on inequitable voting mechanisms which vary by
locale. What is interesting, however, is that in recent years with Shaw and its progeny, the Court
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The problem with the Court's holding, however, was that while it
theoretically opened the door to greater franchise by attempting to
equalize the techniques used for counting ballots in close elections, it
foreclosed any real opportunity to redress the disenfranchisement that
occurred during Election 2000 because of its strict adherence to the
Electoral College deadline. As one scholar stated: "[Tihe U.S. Su-
preme Court denied the right of ... citizens to cast votes that were
effective to ensure that everyone who voted could cast an effective
vote .... [t]he decision on the merits vindicated the right to vote. But
. . . the Court's termination of the recount defeated the right to
vote. "163
The Court was widely criticized for its dubious change of heart as
well as for its political motivations. Many scholars, 64 commenta-
tors, 165 and jaded voters166 contend that the Court's opinion was na-
has not viewed voting rights as an aggregate issue yielding protection of certain classes, but
through the lens of individual rights. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protec-
tion: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE, supra note 154. Thus,
majoritarian groups have co-opted the Court's legal analysis to bring claims of injuries. Id.
Given the fact that George W. Bush, as a party to this case, was far from a protected class, the
majority's view may simply be an extension of its recent voting rights jurisprudence. The linger-
ing question that remains, however, is what the Court will do if presented with a case factually
similar to Bush, with arbitrary standards for manual recounts in a state-wide recount. In such a
question the Court's legitimacy may lie.
163. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 23.
164. Professor Jack Balkin's comments on Bush illustrate much of the acerbic reaction sur-
rounding the decision: "[diuring the last five years or so, I have been consistently wrong about
what the Court was willing to do to promote its conservative agenda. Repeatedly . . . I have
thought to myself: 'They can't possibly do that. That would be crazy. And each time I have been
proven wrong."' Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1446 (2001), cited in TUSHNET, supra note 73, at 7. See also A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION, supra note 75, at 8-10.
165. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., So Much for States' Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35;
Mary McGrory, Supreme Travesty of Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A3; Anthony Lewis,
A Failure of Reason, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2000, at A19. Even one conservative commentator
noted that the Bush majority should have remained consistent with its jurisprudence by remand-
ing the case and allowing the state of Florida to make the final decision regarding the recount.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A26.
166. Dean E. Murphy, The 43rd President. The Voters-New York; Some Americans Seem
Ready to Move on, but Others Aren't So Sure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A31. Maurice De
Witt, a registered Democrat from the Upper West Side who seasonally works as Santa Claus had
some interesting observations of the holiday-time election decision, as noted in a New York
Times article:
This is the case of the Grinch who stole the election, he said. I know as Santa Claus I
am supposed to be apolitical, but I also know a Grinch when I see one .... He said he
felt cheated by the Supreme Court decision, which, he said, blocked a fair tally of bal-
lots, many cast by blacks like himself and members of other minority groups. As an
African-American, Mr. De Witt said, he has grown accustomed to discrimination. But
this time, he said, they did it legally, through the Supreme Court. That is what hurts the
most.
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kedly motivated by political considerations, as evidenced by Justices
quickly converting to views they had adamantly opposed on the re-
cord. 167 The Justices known as champions of states' rights1 68 suddenly
lauded the Equal Protection Clause while Justices better known for
their love of the Equal Protection Clause than state's rights 169 de-
fended Florida's right and ability to decide its own election proce-
dures in the vein of state's rights language.170 The Court's opinion,
despite the consequences and careful case-specific factual framing for
Election 2000, stands as precedent that the lower courts will follow
when presiding over future voting rights cases, including claims
brought under the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act.
D. The Fundamental Right to Vote
The right to vote is a relatively recent sacrosanct right. This section
explores the history of this constitutional right and discusses the level
of scrutiny that the Supreme Court applies to voting cases.
1. Level of Scrutiny
The right to vote, while not explicitly stated in the Constitution, was
deemed a fundamental right by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v.
Sims 171 and Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.172 In both
cases the Warren Court articulated for the first time the fundamental
nature of franchise. 173 The Court analyzed the right to vote as funda-
mental, and under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Id.
167. See the concurrence of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
the Court's avowed textualists and protectors of comity and federalism. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring at 112-13).
168. See Sunstein, supra note 162, at 213-14 n.39. Professor Sunstein points out that:
One of the real oddities of the majority opinion is that it was joined by two Justices-
Scalia and Thomas-who have insisted in their commitment to "originalism" as a
method of constitutional interpretation. There is no reason to think that by adopting
the Equal Protection Clause, the nation thought that it was requiring clear and specific
standards in the context of manual recounts in statewide elections. In fact it is contro-
versial to say that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to voting at all. The failure of
Justices Scalia and Thomas to suggest the relevance of originalism, their preferred
method, raises many puzzles.
Id.
169. See Ann Althouse, Litigating the Presidency: The Election 2000 Decision and Its Ramifi-
cations for the Supreme Court: The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litiga-
tion, 61 MD. L. REV. 508 (2002).
170. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 151, at 186.
171. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
172. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
173. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
20041
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Clause, applied strict scrutiny to the fundamental rights implicated in
both claims.174
In Reynolds, the Court struck down the apportionment system in
the Alabama legislature, holding for the first time that the right to
vote was a fundamental interest, in part because it is preservative of
all other rights.175 Alabama's legislative districts were still based on a
census from 1900, a time when most of the State was rurally-based. 176
Yet, by 1964 when Reynolds came before the Supreme Court, the
State's population had migrated to urban centers. 177 What the Court
took issue with was the "historic practice of basing political represen-
tation in legislative bodies on units of political geography-such as
counties, towns and the like-even if those units had vastly differing
populations. '178
The Court firmly held that Alabama's system, and its reliance on a
sixty-year-old census, effectively diluted a citizen's right to vote based
on where the citizen lived, thus amounting to a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 79 In a sweeping
decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required that seats in both houses of a bicameral
system be apportioned on a population basis such that representation
was based on "one person, one vote."1 80
In Harper, the Court struck down a Virginia poll tax in which the
eligibility to vote in state elections depended on one's ability to pay a
fee. 181 Since the Court had recently pronounced the right to vote as
fundamental in Reynolds just two years before, any burden on
franchise was then to be judged under the strictest scrutiny. 82 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held Virginia's poll tax, regardless of its long-
standing history under state law, constituted invidious discrimina-
tion.183 The Court held that wealth, affluence or ability to pay a fee
does not provide a compelling state interest so as to distinguish be-
174. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
175. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the
Court first declared that the right of suffrage is "a fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights." Id. at 370. It was not until Reynolds that the aspirational nature of
the Yick Wo language became a legal reality. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
176. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 542 n.7, 545.
177. Id.
178. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 86-87.
179. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84.
180. Id. at 558.
181. See generally Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
182. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 553-61.
183. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-67.
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tween voters when a fundamental right is at stake. 184 In a broad dec-
laration of the crucial nature of the right to vote, the Court
emphasized that franchise must be closely guarded because the right
to vote protects all other rights. 185
In both Reynolds and Harper the Court did not inquire into the
intent of the legislation restricting enfranchisement. 186 Rather, the
tests were effects-based, analyzing the cases such that "regardless of
the intent with which the enacting body created a representative insti-
tution that departed from equally weighted votes, that departure
would be unconstitutional." 187 Notable in this area of jurisprudence is
the Court's "growing awareness of political equality as a legitimating
foundation for our form of government.' ' 188 Regardless of whether
individuals "win in the electoral process, it is possible to accept the
outcome if one has an equal voice in the process."18 9 In fact, begin-
ning with Reynolds and continuing in Harper, the Court has applied
its most exacting strict scrutiny in equal protection challenges to effec-
tuate the principle of "one person, one vote." 190 These pivotal cases
have engendered a relatively recent and significant body of constitu-
tional law adhering to the basic principles of the fundamental right to
vote. 191
Since the Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965, litigation sur-
rounding this newly recognized constitutional right has mostly evolved
184. Id.
185. Quoting Reynolds, the Court stated,
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
186. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
187. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 87 (emphasis added).
188. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 192 (1985).
189. Id. Tribe notes the influence of social contract theory, a primary foundation for our
Constitution. He explains, "it is said, the rational individual will consent to government only if
guaranteed an equal voice in its deliberations." Id. at 394 n.44. Tribe suggests to see JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1690); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221-34 (1971); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980) for further information.
190. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558. Creating an even more compelling level of intrigue to the
Court's exacting scrutiny in voting rights is the relatively recent holding that the franchise is a
fundamental right. See TRIBE, supra note 188, at 394 n.45. Although the franchise has been
revered as fundamental since Reynolds, prior to 1964 the Court had little to do with disen-
franchisement claims, which clearly ran rampant through the Jim Crow South. Id. Furthermore,
"it took a separate constitutional amendment to extend the franchise to women." Id. See also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
191. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1062-84, 1436-60 (2d ed.
1988).
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from either section 2 or section 5 of the Act. 192 While this Comment
seeks to analyze the legal landscape of the Voting Rights Act forty
years after its enactment, the area of focus necessarily falls upon the
jurisprudence rooted in the actual and constructive disenfranchise-
ment of African-Americans and other minorities denied the franchise.
The Voting Rights Act grew out of the civil rights movement, fighting
for the racial equality of African-Americans. Thus, its purpose has
developed to encompass all racial and even insular minorities such as
citizens whose first language is not English. 193 Unfortunately, how-
ever, categorical exclusion to the ballot box still exists in legal forms.
In many states, ex-felons who have served their sentence are denied
access to vote. 194 Indeed, some exclusions were aimed at disen-
franchising African-Americans. 195
The voting rights litigation in the forty years since the Voting Rights
Act was enacted has taken an often meandering path towards
franchise.' 96 The "first generation" of claims, characterized by actual
disenfranchisement in the form of physical intimidation and blatant
techniques of disenfranchisement, were almost entirely extinguished
by the 1980s. 197 The "second generation" of cases, which broadened
and augmented the reach of voting rights jurisprudence, focused on
political equality and the dilution of a citizen's vote.198 While this
course of litigation has created a renewed focus on the underlying ob-
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988). The covered language minorities were: "Spanish her-
itage," Native Americans, Asian Americans, and Alaskan natives. §§ 1973aa-la(e). See also
Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (1992). See
generally de la Garza & Desipio, supra note 101.
194. For an in-depth analysis of felon disenfranchisement, see George P. Fletcher, Disen-
franchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895
(1999); see also Michael A. Fletcher, Voting Rights for Felons Win Support, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
1999, at Al.
195. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking down an Alabama felon-disen-
franchisement law because of the intent to disenfranchise African-Americans).
196. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINOR-
ITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987) (tracing the history of the 1965 Voting Rights Act). See also Pamela
S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
287 (1996); Karlan, supra note 109.
197. First generation voting rights claims address the issue of access to the ballot box, specifi-
cally, "the conditions under which the right to vote is legislatively meted out." See ISSACHAROFF
ET AL., supra note 15, at 86.
198. The second generation of voting rights claims focus on the point when "even after access
to the ballot box is nearly universal, the Equal Protection Clause can impose limits on the ways
in which those votes are aggregated to produce the actual electoral outcome." See
ISAACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 15, at 86. See also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (1964) (stating that
"the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise").
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stacles against full minority political participation,' 99 and thus effec-
tive disenfranchisement through vote dilution,200 much of the
litigation in this area has been stymied by the Rehnquist Court's view
of voting rights jurisprudence.201
Indeed, some scholars and voting rights activists posit that the Vot-
ing Rights Act has lost its remedial abilities as it has become a force
for white activists as well. In the "third generation" of Voting Rights
Act cases, litigation focuses on vote dilution and redistricting of mi-
nority districts.20 2 While this would likely be an effective strategy to
boost minority representation in legislatures, the Supreme Court re-
peatedly has aligned itself with a "color-blind" approach to voting
rights litigation as seen in the Shaw line of cases. 20 3 As a result, white
voters used the Voting Rights Act to assert their own injuries of an
ineffective vote from the allegedly diluted vote. 2
0 4
The level of scrutiny applicable to Voting Rights Act claims, in light
of Bush v. Gore, focuses on the remedial avenues available to citizens
whose right to franchise has been abridged.20 5 The expansive view of
voting in Bush has opened a window of possibility. The Court opened
the opportunity by applying a novel equal protection analysis, with no
legal precedent, to the fairness in a state's mechanisms and procedures
of the fundamental right to vote. 20 6 Yet, by reaffirming the fundamen-
tal nature of the right to vote as recognized and established by Reyn-
199. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REP-
RESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The
question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993); Samuel Issacharoff, Po-
larized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992).
200. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
201. Karlan, supra note 162, at 77.
202. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Mem-
ber Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1152 (1993).
203. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (political gerrymandering to create an African-
American majority district still raises an equal protection claim even though its purpose is to
help a historically disadvantaged minority); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Texas legislature's
redistricting scheme creating two majority African-American districts and one majority Hispanic
district declared unconstitutional because race was the predominant factor in drawing the dis-
tricts); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (remanded because issue of fact remained as to
whether the redistricting was influenced by voter concentrations of political party membership):
Easley v. Cromartie. 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (The fact that racial identification is highly correlated
to political affiliation does not raise an equal protection claim, thus the State did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause by redistricting to create a majority-Democratic district.).
204. See Shaw, 509 U.S. 630. In Shaw, white voters asserted their own case under the Voting
Rights Act through the dilution of their votes. Id. at 638. The white voters no longer had a
majority in their district after it had been redrawn to allow for a majority African-American
legislative district in North Carolina. Id. at 633-39.
205. See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
206. See A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION, supra note 75, at 7-55.
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olds and Harper, the Bush v. Gore Court reached broadly to the
disenfranchised masses, evoking images of a fundamental and sacro-
sanct interest embodied by the franchise. 20 7 But in the same broad
stroke, the Court disenfranchised those voters, as the majority opinion
foreclosed any real possibility of renewed ballot counting with uni-
form standards in Election 2000.208
Arguably, the level of scrutiny in federal voting rights cases should
be strict because of the fundamental interest involved.20 9 However,
with the current Supreme Court ever-watchful of federalism, it has
waffled on the scrutiny applied to more nuanced voting rights cases,
thus making it difficult to draw a line between when strict scrutiny is
triggered and when some lesser level of scrutiny is sufficient. 210
The proper level of scrutiny in light of Bush v. Gore is decidedly
muddled.211 The language of the opinion, relying heavily on the com-
pelling state interest for a specific route of ballot-counting in light of
the fundamental right at stake, seems to hint at a strict scrutiny stan-
dard. 212 In dissent, however, Justice Souter attempted to carefully
cabin the decision by giving deference to the many alternatives a mu-
nicipality can choose in enacting its election procedures. 21 3
2. Voting Rights Litigation in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore
Some key cases raising legal questions of voter disenfranchisement,
equal protection, and due process were brought in the Bush v. Gore
aftermath. 214 The litigation focused primarily on the actual disen-
207. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
208. The Court stopped all chance for the Florida Supreme Court to consider the proper
standards in the state-wide recount on December 12, as the majority felt bound by the "Safe
Harbor" Provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5, which requires that any controversy or contest that is de-
signed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. Bush, 531
U.S. at 111. Since the Court decided the case on December 12 and the Florida Supreme Court
did not have a chance to review and determine what a constitutionally acceptable standard
would be, the Supreme Court ordered that all recounts be halted. Id.
209. See TRIBE, supra note 191, at 1062-84, 1436-60.
210. For an excellent discussion of the meandering voting rights jurisprudence, see Heather K.
Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). Given
the current Court's proclivities to reshape and redefine remedial forms of race-based classifica-
tions, the intersection of a protected class, gerrymandered districts, attempts at undiluted votes,
and fundamental rights creates quite a quandary for the Court's leanings. Professor Gerken
provides insight into how best to reconcile these competing interests and dueling doctrines. Id.
at 1663. It would be interesting to see how her article would have addressed Bush v. Gore had
her piece still been in progress just six months later. See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916-17
(1996).
211. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
212. Id. at 105.
213. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. See Mulroy, supra note 156, at 358 (describing the focus of post-Bush v. Gore litigation).
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franchisement experienced by numerous voters due to shoddy ballot
equipment used during Election 2000.215 Lower courts have been
challenged to make sense of the Supreme Court's decision as it relates
to the long line of voting rights jurisprudence under both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act.
Suits were brought in Cook County, Illinois and Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia challenging the use of punch-card ballot machines in some pre-
cincts.2 16 The precincts which used the punch-card ballot machinery
had much higher rates of discarded ballots, and thus higher rates of
disenfranchised voters.2 17 The complaints alleged that disenfranchise-
ment was exponentially higher in precincts that were more likely to be
poor and have a concentration of minorities than it was in wealthier
precincts.2 18 Meanwhile, in wealthier districts with a concentration of
mostly white, upper-middle class voters, ballot technology was more
advanced and as a result, the likelihood of disenfranchisement was
reduced by half.21 9 These claims were brought under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 20
The lower courts that applied Bush v. Gore relied on the Court's
sweep of the fundamental right to vote in another arena-the ballot
box. While the Bush v. Gore majority tried to carefully narrow its
decision to the specific facts of the Florida recount, courts dealing
with similar issues of discarded, but valid votes arising from the same
election, decided not to distinguish the two cases; rather, lower courts
chose to view the cases as an extension of the issues before the Court
in December 2000.
In Black v. McGuffage,221 the ACLU brought a suit against Cook
County, Illinois on behalf of "Latino and African American voters in
counties throughout Illinois" to enjoin the county from using punch
card ballot voting technology, as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, Due Process Clause, and the Voting Rights Act.222 The court
215. Id.
216. B.J. Palermo, Suits Push 3 States to End Punch Card Voting, California Decision Is Latest
Action, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at Al; B.J. Palermo, "Bush v. Gore" Reverberates from Coast-
to-Coast, THE RECORDER, Sept. 11, 2001, at 3.
217. See Mulroy, supra note 156, at 358.
218. Id. at 358-59.
219. Id.
220. See Mulroy, supra note 156, at 358, (discussing Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889,
896-900 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
221. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 896-900.
222. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
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in Black found startling disparities of ballot success rates depending
on where a voter lived.
Voting error rates (the rates at which votes expressed by the voter
were not picked up by the machines) varied from less than 1% in
"optiscan counties" using "error notification" technology (which
notifies the voter of an error in the precinct so as to give the voter
an opportunity to correct her ballot) to more than 4% in "punch-
card counties" without error notification. Error rates varied dra-
matically even among jurisdictions using the same equipment
system. In some wards using the punchcard without error notifica-
tion the rate rose as high as 12%; in one precinct, it rose as high as
37%. Plaintiffs alleged these varying error rates had a disparate im-
pact on Hispanic and African-American voters. As a result of these
differences, the "probability of an uncounted vote" was 22 times
greater in [racially diverse] Chicago than in [ninety-four percent
white] McHenry County.2 23
The defendants have since settled the case and have agreed to update
and implement new voting technology for the 2004 presidential
elections. 224
In Common Cause Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Jones,225 the plaintiffs contend that "while only 53.4% of the voters in
California use punchcard machines, these voters accounted for 74.8%
of the votes rejected due to ballot error. '226 The court denied various
defendant motions and held that the plaintiffs did not have to allege
racially discriminatory intent.22 7 The defendants agreed to implement
new voting technology by the 2005 elections, but the plaintiffs pushed
further and received a court order for the implementation to be com-
plete by the 2004 presidential elections. 228
In light of recent success in voting rights litigation since Bush v.
Gore, the real question becomes what framework will set the Voting
223. Mulroy, supra note 156, at 354-60. For a statistical demographic breakdown, see U.S.
Census Bureau, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17117111.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2004).
224. See Mulroy, supra note 156, at 358.
225. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
226. Mulroy, supra note 156, at 359. It is also important to note here how this same argument
and factual contention played out for voters during the California recall election of Governor
Gray Davis in October 2003. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344
F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the
district court's holding that plaintiffs had not established a clear probability of an equal protec-
tion violation and Voting Rights Act claim in the upcoming California Recall Election, only a
possibility of such a claim. Id. at 918. Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit to delay the election so it could
be conducted without the error-riddled punch-card system. Id. at 917.
227. Common Cause S. Christian Leadership Conference, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1108-09.
228. Id.
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Rights Act back on its path to universal franchise.2 29 Has Bush v.
Gore infused new life into the Voting Rights Act and voting rights
litigation, whose legacy was becoming mired and arguably ineffective
with meandering paths to franchise vindication? Additionally, will
race matter less in the voting rights arena now that the fundamental
right to franchise has once again focused a strict scrutiny lens on the
same language of individual rights bestowed upon it in Harper and
Reynolds?
1II. ANALYSIS: IS THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OVER THE HILL YET
OR ARE THERE STILL MOUNTAINS TO CLIMB?
In its forty year history the Voting Rights Act has expanded and
changed to meet the evolving challenges of disenfranchisement. How-
ever, through its evolution the Voting Rights Act may have lost some
of its strength. This analysis seeks to answer whether the Voting
Rights Act is over the hill yet or if there are still mountains to climb.
A. The Use of Voting Rights Legislation in Litigation
The Voting Rights Act as a tool for litigation has evolved enor-
mously in strategy and style over its forty years. Immediately follow-
ing its passage, the Voting Rights Act primarily served as the first
defense against actual, physical disenfranchisement of African-Ameri-
cans. 230 Also known as the "first generation" challenges to overt
black disenfranchisement, the Voting Rights Act became part and par-
cel of the civil rights movement. 23' As poll taxes, property require-
ments, and grandfather clauses became relics of the past,2 32 new forms
of subtle discrimination replaced overtly racist methods of disen-
franchisment and ushered in the next generation of voting rights
claims, which concentrated on vote dilution and the concomitant right
to an undiluted vote.2 33
Voting Rights Act 234 litigation since the 1980s has primarily become
a tool for equalizing the range of voter effectiveness-or ineffective-
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1975e (2000). See also infra notes 230-279 and accompanying text.
230. See Edward Still, Enfranchising the Disenfranchised, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 249 (2001).
231. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991) (explaining how first-generation
challenges of actual black disenfranchisement evolved to second-generation attempts at creating
significant political and electoral opportunities for newly-enfranchised minorities).
232. See KEYSSAR, supra note 34, at 256-58. See also supra Part II.
233. See Guinier, supra note 231, at 1093.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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ness, given the nature of the voter dilution claims235-in legislative
elections. 236 While courts have rarely acknowledged the group-re-
lated aspects of dilution claims, the dilution doctrine has reflected the
aggregate nature of these second generation voting rights claims to a
remarkable extent.2 37 Indeed, even while the Court has lacked, until
recently, 238 a fully articulated conceptual framework for dealing with
dilution claims, the Court has slowly moved towards treating individ-
ual voting rights through a group lens, even when that approach is at
odds with a conventional view of individual rights.239 A noteworthy
element of earlier dilution doctrine is that dilution claims depended
entirely on the treatment of the group as a whole. 240 The Court is
235. Voting Rights claims based on dilution doctrine reflect the second generation of voting
rights cases, which involve the right of an individual to cast an undiluted vote. See generally
Guinier, supra note 231. Essentially, the claim arises when minority citizens cannot effectively
elect their candidate of choice in political elections because their votes are diluted by a larger
concentration of white voters in their district. Id.
236. See cases cited supra note 203.
237. See Guinier, supra note 231, at 1094-1101.
238. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996). Since Shaw v. Hunt was the second time the
Court had presided over the issues in this case it is commonly referred to as Shaw IL In Shaw II,
despite previous aversion to viewing individual rights as a group, the Court nonetheless instinc-
tively moved toward an aggregate rights approach. See generally Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899.
239. See Gerken, supra note 210, at 1665-66.
240. Professor Gerken explains:
In De Grandy, for example, the plaintiffs tried to establish liability by pointing to a
number of places in the state where minority voters were "fractured" -that is, placed in
majority-white districts where whites would always outvote them. The De Grandy
Court, however, rejected fracturing as a basis for liability. It held that if the group as a
whole enjoys rough proportionality, a dilution claim will fail regardless of how the state
treats individual group members. Thus, even those who have suffered what appears to
be a concrete "harm"-the inability to elect their candidate of choice-cannot claim dilu-
tion if the group as a whole is treated fairly.
In Shaw II, the Supreme Court broke with this longstanding tradition. Having recog-
nized a cause of action for challenging race-based districting, the Court was forced to
confront the differences between its highly individualistic view of rights and the aggre-
gative aspects of dilution. North Carolina, accused of a racial gerrymander, defended
the challenged districts as an appropriate remedy to avoid a § 2 violation. As a result,
the Court had to decide how to apply strict scrutiny, a doctrine developed within the
context of conventional individual rights, to districts drawn to avoid dilution, an aggre-
gate harm. Thus, these disparate strains of equal protection doctrine came into direct
contact in Shaw H, and strict scrutiny became the framework for mediating the differ-
ences between them.
Faced with this doctrinal puzzle, the Supreme Court not only applied a self-con-
sciously individualist approach to dilution remedies, but also explicitly rejected some of
the basic tenets of an aggregate rights approach as signaling the existence of a "group"
right. Shaw HI thus provides an excellent example of how the conceptual differences
between conventional individual rights and dilution claims (described in Part I) actually
play out in practice.
Id. at 1690-91 (footnotes omitted).
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beginning to grasp the nuanced group-nature of dilution claims as
they relate to the individual right to vote.241
From some vantage points, it appears that the Court's view of the
newest class of Voting Rights Act claims under dilution doctrine is
similar to its more recent approach in addressing other remedial race
claims, such as affirmative action requiring strict scrutiny for classifi-
cations based on race even if the race-based classification is for a re-
medial purpose.242 Many scholars view the Court's shift towards this
"newest form of equal protection" as significant but predictable given
the philosophical tendencies of the current majority.2 43 By employing
so-called "color-blind" justice,2 44 the Court today views the use of the
Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause more as a protec-
tion for any individual whose vote may be diluted rather than the ex-
press purpose of the Voting Rights Act-to redress the
disenfranchisement of minority voters. 245
In analyzing the predictability of the Court's recent evolution, and
thus the inevitable outcome in Bush v. Gore,24 6 Professor Pamela
Karlan posits the view that the unfolding equal protection doctrine
employed in Bush v. Gore is just another step on a continuum towards
decreasing the Equal Protection Clause's remedial measures.247 In-
deed, in 1993, the Supreme Court acknowledged a third equal protec-
tion argument to the two well developed voting rights claims of
disenfranchisement and dilution. 248 Some have labeled the newest
equal protection claim as one of metagovernance, or a "claim about
the rules by which the democratic political processes are structured. It
is a claim that the very use of race in the process of redistricting is
241. Id.
242. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that under equal protection claims with
governmental race classifications involved, the classification must serve a compelling govern-
mental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that interest).
243. Karlan, supra note 162 at 77-78; see also Gerken, supra note 210, at 1670.
244. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE
VOTE, supra note 154, at 77.
245. See generally cases cited supra note 203. How ironic it must be for civil rights veterans to
see their greatest weapons, the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause, used to
protect white voters in minority districts. See Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and
the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 641 (1996).
246. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
247. Professor Karlan notes that "[u]nfortunately for equal protection law, Bush v. Gore is
not an aberration. Rather, it is yet another manifestation of the newest model of equal protec-
tion, a model laid out in the Court's decisions regarding race-conscious redistricting and Con-
gress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." (footnotes omitted). Karlan, supra note
162, at 77-78.
248. See cases cited supra note 203.
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illegitimate. 2 49 As a result, much of the Court's new equal protection
doctrine protects white voters in minority districts to effectuate color-
blind justice, regardless of the continuing inequality in minority elec-
toral power.250
Similarly, given the framework of equal protection jurisprudence as
a guardian of "discrete and insular minorities, 25 1 the Rehnquist
Court's shift towards the superior nature of individual rights, greater
than any redress for historical wrongs, sets an appropriate stage for
the Bush v. Gore majority to view voters as individuals rather than
looking at the aggregate nature of the harm, even with evidence of a
significant harm falling on protected classes.252 The strong stance of
the Rehnquist Court towards individual rights 253 has turned the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence away from the Warren Court's view of
certain areas of law as inherently rooted in group rights, 254 especially
in the area of redress for historical wrongs.
Finally, the 1982 amendments gave voting rights activists a crucial
leap with the articulation of discrimination based on impact, rather
249. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE
VOTE, supra note 154, at 77-78. Professor Karlan clearly frames the Court's at-times confusing
voting rights jurisprudence:
Disenfranchisement involved outright denial of the ability to cast a ballot. Dilution,
by contrast, occurred when the votes of some identifiable group counted for less than
the votes of other voters. Shaw [v. Reno] added a third type of equal protection claim:
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-
neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that
the separation lacks sufficient justification.
Plaintiffs in Shaw cases need not prove either that they were denied the right to vote or
that their votes were diluted. In fact, despite the Court's reliance on prior vote dilution
and disenfranchisement decisions, the real character of a Shaw case is not a claim about
voting rights at all .... the right to vote embodies a nested constellation of concepts:
participation-the entitlement to cast a ballot and have that ballot counted; aggrega-
tion-the choice among rules for tallying votes to determine election winners; and gov-
ernance-the ability to have one's policy preferences enacted into law within the
process of representative decision-making. Shaw plaintiffs are not advancing a claim
under any of these concepts. Rather, they are pressing a claim involving what we might
call "metagovernance," that is, a claim about the rules by which the democratic political
processes are structured. It is a claim that the very use of race in the process of redis-
tricting is illegitimate.
Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
250. Id.
251. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
252. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
253. See Stephen G. Bragaw & Barbara A. Perry, The "Brooding Omnipresence" in Bush v.
Gore: Anthony Kennedy, the Equality Principle, and Judicial Supremacy, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 19 (2002).
254. Id.
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than discriminatory intent.255 The leap must be emphasized as it
spawned a strong front-line defense against many of the more subtle
and nuanced forms of minority disenfranchisement. 256 In 1986, the
Supreme Court opened the door to discriminatory impact cases, af-
firming the constitutionality of the 1982 Amendments in the pro-
cess. 257 In fact, in Thornburg v. Gingles,258 the Court addressed a
challenge to multi-member election districts and their impact on mi-
nority electoral prospects.2 59 The new articulation of what franchise
truly means, the ability to elect representatives who can indeed re-
present a voter's interests, trickled down to its constitutional founda-
tion.2 60 The Court dismissed the "multidimensional statutory 'totality
of the circumstances' inquiry ...[and] adopted a simplified test to
determine whether white voters as a group had frustrated the electo-
ral aspirations of a cohesive set of minority voters and, if so, whether
255. See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980). The Mobile Court required proof
of discriminatory intent or purpose in order to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. In fact, the institutional discrimination (which often replaced the facially unconstitutional
racist procedures in many parts of the country) seemed to be ignored in Bolden, especially since
it was decided during a period of the Court pulling back its Equal Protection Clause jurispru-
dence. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (all holding that
the requisite burden of proof relies on the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrim-
ination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
257. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). See also Issacharoff, supra note 199, at
1833. Indeed, Professor Issacharoff's question in 1992, similar to this Comment's inquiry twelve
years later, asked why voting rights litigation was not yet obsolete.
258. See generally Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30.
259. Id. It was the first case requiring the Court to construe section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as amended in 1982. Id. at 42. The Court held that the redistricting plan proposed by the North
Carolina General Assembly violated section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act because it resulted in
the dilution of black citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice in all of the disputed
districts. Id. at 52.
260. The Court carefully scrutinized the purpose and gravity of the 1982 Amendments in light
of the circumstances surrounding the legal reality of political elections in North Carolina, less
than twenty years after the demise of Jim Crow laws. Id. at 61. Noting the magnitude of dis-
crimination that was still vibrant in various spheres of North Carolina daily life, the Court up-
held the District Court's finding of constitutional violations:
The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the circumstances
and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimina-
tion in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the
persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimem-
ber districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically co-
hesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice. It found that the success a few black candidates have en-
joyed in these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982 elections,
perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion.
Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
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an alteration of electoral practices could relieve the diminution of mi-
nority electoral opportunity. ' 261 The expansive view of the Voting
Rights Act set the stage for new claims. However, as already dis-
cussed, with the Court's shifting majority, the framework of such cases
quickly turned away from minority voting rights activists and carved a
channel for majoritarian voting rights claims.2 62
A strategy for furthering minority rights, however, remains in the
Court's own language of individual rights.263 What talented litigants
may be able to successfully argue in future voting rights cases is an
entirely new framework dressed in the language of Bush v. Gore. Ap-
plying the discriminatory impact of Election 2000,264 such a complaint
can be framed within the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act.265 In essence, by illustrating the disparate impact along racial
lines, the fundamental right to vote and the Equal Protection Clause
would be triggered by the actual and constructive disenfranchisement
evident in Election 2000. With a revived sense of the fundamental
nature of the right to vote in the Court's Bush v. Gore opinion, mean-
ingful challenges through the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause may indeed evolve out of the Court's careful yet clear
language.
B. Voting Rights as Seen Through the Lens of Bush v. Gore
In light of the ever-winding path of voting rights litigation and its
recent and rather odd judicial stepchild, Bush v. Gore, students and
scholars of constitutional law cannot help but ask what the quagmire
means for voting rights in the wake of the most controversial Supreme
Court decision in recent years. Undoubtedly voting rights and abso-
lute enfranchisement still have a long way to go. While the days of
blatant and institutionalized disenfranchisement may be relics of the
Jim Crow era, remnants still remain. 266 It was not until the United
States had such a closely contested election that the public became
fully aware of how many votes were "lost" every election,2 67 meaning
that hundreds of thousands of voters have been unknowingly disen-
franchised each election cycle.
261. Issacharoff, supra note 199, at 1834-35.
262. See cases cited supra note 203.
263. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000).
264. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
266. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
267. "Lost" votes in the sense that thousands of undervotes, overvotes, and discarded ballots
were not counted. See generally Posner, supra note 155, at 165.
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Viewing voting rights jurisprudence and the Voting Rights Act
through the tinted lens of Bush v. Gore triggers much pause in the
cacophony that critics and supporters have made in trying to make
sense of the situation. Critics such as constitutional law professors Sa-
muel Issacharoff and Cass Sunstein contend that no explanation of the
Court's decision can be truly understood without an overt discussion
of the underlying political consequences enveloped in the case. 268
Regardless of the arguably partisan decision in Bush v. Gore, voting
rights jurisprudence as framed by the Court's Bush v. Gore language
has clearly taken a turn in its path to greater or even universal en-
franchisement. 269 Some scholars argue, along with the carefully
couched majority opinion, that Bush v. Gore sets no real, tangible pre-
cedent as it simply was an immediate judicial answer to an explosive
national crisis, a situation that needed an answer quickly to prevent
political chaos.270
On the other hand, the Supreme Court currently faces an enormous
vicious circle. In essence, this dilemma presents the Court with two
options, both of which threaten the Court's legitimacy in the eyes of
many citizens. First, the Court can continue to hold tantamount, as it
did in Bush v. Gore, the fundamental right to vote and the concurrent
right to equal protection through uniform voting systems. This option,
however, opens the door to numerous valid claims of disenfranchised
voters based on the out-dated and shoddy equipment a given county
or municipality uses. In the background of such claims is the Court's
dilemma: States' rights proponents will stridently argue the tenets of
federalism and that each jurisdiction should be able to formulate its
voting mechanisms as it sees fit. However, the very same argu-
ments-set forth by the Gore legal team-were quickly dismissed
under the guise of the Equal Protection Clause in Bush v. Gore.
Therefore, for the Court to follow suit and not appear partisan in the
future, such voting rights claims will probably have a strong chance of
success.
268. Indeed, Sunstein insists that Bush v. Gore thrusts to the fore the undeniable intertwining
of politics and law, as articulated in large part by the legal realist movements of the 1930s, fur-
ther shoring up the contention that the line between political and legal judgments is rather hazy.
See Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 205.
269. Id. at 101. See generally Mulroy, supra note 156. Interestingly, the Bush v. Gore opinion
was per curiam and thus unsigned.
270. See generally Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore as Pragmatic Adjudication, in A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION, supra note 75, at 187-213; David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They
Thinking?, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 184-204; John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, in THE VOTE, supra note 154, at 221-40; Cass R. Sunstein, Lawless Order and Hot
Cases, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION, supra note 154, at 75-104.
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Quite plainly, access to efficient and successful ballot-boxes needs
much improvement, as Election 2000 exposed "new" voting rights in-
juries and illustrated the grave fractures in the United States' electoral
system that coincidentally fell on economic, geographic, and in some
cases along racial lines.2 7' It seems that the Bush Court's reliance on
the fundamental rights strand of franchise jurisprudence under Harper
and Reynolds, as key doctrinal support will open the door to system-
atic legal challenges. By reviving the first generation Voting Rights
Act cases, which revolved around claims of physical and actual disen-
franchisement, the Supreme Court may have paved the way for nu-
merous other disenfranchisement claims to follow in Bush v. Gore's
wake.
C. Making Sense of Voting Rights in Light of Bush v. Gore:
A Fact-Specific Case or Solid Precedent for Future
Voting Rights Cases?
The arena of voting rights jurisprudence may either receive a large
boost from the Supreme Court after Bush v. Gore and the tenets it
claims to hold to, or it may continue in a somewhat stagnant condition
as it has since Shaw and its progeny.272 However, given the difficulties
encountered in post-Shaw franchise claims, Bush v. Gore may stand as
the harbinger of greater voting rights litigation and serve to refresh
the Voting Rights Act.
Although the conflicting decision danced around the bigger claims
of enfranchisement and effectively disenfranchised thousands of vot-
ers in the actual moment of Election 2000, it does raise the inevitable
question of what kind of solid precedent such a nebulous decision can
make. Does Bush v. Gore inadvertently get the Voting Rights Act
and voting'rights litigation back on track with strong language regard-
ing the importance of each person's vote, or will it be discarded as a
Supreme Court aberration plaguing its legitimacy? As we come upon
the fortieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in what
shape is its legacy and are we really over the hill yet?
The Voting Rights Act and the principles it was meant to uphold
are as necessary today as they were during the fervor of the civil rights
271. See Overton, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
272. Shaw's progeny includes: Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
542 (1999); Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. 977 (2000). See also Kim Lane Scheppele, When the
Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1361 (2001); Ginsburg Recalls Florida Recount Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at A25; Pamela S.
Karlan, Redistricting in a New America: Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001).
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movement.2 73 While disenfranchisement obviously occurs in different
shapes and sizes today (and in Election 2000), it is not simply a relic of
America's past. 274 Rather, disenfranchisement still plagues the
United States. 275 Modern disenfranchisement, similar to current and
historical inequalities in education, housing, and health care,2 76 occur
in subtle, yet narrowly proscribed forms. When the geographic region
where citizens live (even within the very same county) can have enor-
mous impact on the ability to have one's vote actually counted, strong
equal protection questions should be triggered. If each citizen, as pos-
ited in Bush v. Gore, has a right to an equally counted vote based on
pre-determined state mechanisms, African-Americans living in poor
urban areas should have voting rights equal to their wealthier white
counterparts in other areas of a city.2 77
Leading scholars in voting rights jurisprudence disagree on the
strength of future claims based on the language of the Bush v. Gore
majority. 278 However, as illustrated by the Court's Catch-22 as it
stares at its judicial legitimacy, such claims are certainly worth a val-
iant and well-crafted try. In the three years since Election 2000, lower
courts have interpreted the Bush majority language without conten-
tious appeals. 279 Partly because the injuries to voting rights in subse-
quent cases have been glaring, many lower courts see the Bush
precedent as a welcome path to vindicate the injured classes before
273. See supra notes 40-262 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
275. Id.
276. The notion that certain interests were fundamental, even if not explicitly protected by the
Constitution, was promulgated by many civil and welfare rights organizations in the 1960s and
1970s. See generally TRIBE, supra note 191. Wealth became a new quasi-suspect classification in
the 1960s. Id. Cases such as Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), illustrated the Court's concern for structures that
predicated wealth as a requirement for obtaining fundamental interests. However, the Court
decisively turned away from the implications of the wealth-discrimination cases in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). As one commentator noted:
[t]he case challenged the widespread use ... of property taxes to finance public educa-
tion by arguing that education was a fundamental interest and that property tax financ-
ing treated rich districts differently from poor ones. Justice Lewis Powell's [majority]
opinion for the Court held that the only truly fundamental interests were those pro-
tected explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution.
TUSHNET, supra note 73, at 72.
277. In fact, the Bush majority states, in reference to the statewide remedy, that "there must
be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamen-
tal fairness are satisfied." 531 U.S at 109.
278. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For a positive view of future voting rights claims in light of Bush v.
Gore, see Mulroy, supra note 156. For a contrasting view that Bush v. Gore stands on its own as
a fact-specific holding and lacks the necessary doctrinal moxy to withstand piggyback claims
fashioned as catalysts for voting rights progress, see Strauss, supra note 270.
279. See generally Mulroy, supra note 156.
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them. Even if such voting rights successes remain at the lower court
levels, the injured parties and disillusioned masses after Election 2000
can use this path under the language of Bush v. Gore to achieve
greater enfranchisement.
IV. IMPACT
As the Voting Rights Act enters its fortieth year, in light of Bush v.
Gore it is necessary to analyze whether Election 2000 was a deviation
or the norm of current franchise.
A. Was Election 2000 a Deviation or Norm of the Franchise?
Looking back at Election 2000 three-and-a-half years later, the
question still remains: was the actual and constructive disenfranchise-
ment of voters in Election 2000 a deviation from the norm of universal
franchise or merely another strike on a disappointing record of the on-
the-ground impact of civil rights laws? While litigation necessarily fo-
cuses on the failures of voting systems, it does not necessarily re-
present the spectrum of failures as a whole.
Given the drastic outcry and shock regarding the actual and con-
structive disenfranchisement of voters in Election 2000, numerous re-
forms have been introduced in state legislatures and Congress to
remedy the failings of our current election systems.280 Millions of dol-
lars have poured into many jurisdictions, especially Florida, to update
voting technology. 281 Part of the goal of such reform has been to rem-
edy the rampant disenfranchisement in Election 2000. Yet, some posit
that the reformers' motivation is to ensure that election decisions re-
turn to the citizens rather than remain in the hands of nine individual
vote-casters. 282
It may be too soon to ascertain whether Election 2000 was an aber-
ration or a norm in the progression of voting rights history. The 2004
elections, replete with legislative reform and millions of dollars
poured into such efforts,283 may serve as the indicative sign of our
nation's progress or how far we still must travel to reach the dream of
280. See ELECTION REFORM 2004: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND WHY 9, 25, 49,
available at http://www.electionline.org/site/docspdf/ERIP-AR2004.pdf (last visited May 23,
2004) [hereinafter ELECTION REFORM 2004].
281. Id.
282. The Court's decision in Bush may have been the strongest realization of dilution doctrine
yet. See Karlan, supra note 272, at 1345.
283. See ELECTION REFORM 2004, supra note 280, for a chronology of the election reform
efforts leading up to Election 2004.
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complete enfranchisement.28 4 In fact, for some voters, the 2004 elec-
tion has turned into a battle of legitimacy; Democrats are pining to
take back the White House they believe was wrongfully stolen from
them and Republicans are striving to put an end to the lingering ques-
tions of President George W. Bush's validity.
285
As the Supreme Court aptly pointed out, the disenfranchisement of
thousands of voters has apparently been happening for years.286 Yet,
disenfranchisement only seems to make headlines and lawsuits when
elections are too close to call.
Simply by considering the statistics of who is likely to be disen-
franchised, gnawing questions of racially discriminatory impact in vot-
ing clearly implicate the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause. With numerous factors such as felon disenfranchisement, the
geographic areas with the most outdated voting equipment-often the
most economically depressed municipalities as well, and who lives in
these geographic areas, these voting rights issues surely must be signif-
icant in more than just the "close" elections. Every election should
raise the inquiry to levels of constitutional magnitude. 287 If discrimi-
natory impact in the actual mechanics of voting is so glaring from
Election 2000, and probably many other unscrutinized elections, how
can litigation correct these clear violations? Will the Court rethink its
"judicially manageable" framing of the 1982 Amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act, when it articulated in Thornburg the right to minority
electoral success as the barometer of equality in the political and vot-
ing process? 288
Noteworthy are the vast investments in voting technology spurred
by Election 2000. In addition to Florida, numerous other states across
the country have invested in improving the franchise for all citizens.
289
Electronic ballots are quickly replacing the irregular punchcard bal-
lots. 290 The days of the butterfly ballot are waning and currently, local
284. For the early origins of the dream of complete enfranchisement, see James Thomas
Tucker, Affirmative Action and [Misirepresentation: Part I - Reclaiming the Civil Rights Vision of
the Right to Vote, 43 How. L.J. 343, 356 (2000).
285. Adam Nagourney, The 2004 Campaign: The Overview; Democrats See Unified Party for
November, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at Al. See also Michael Janofsky, Party Leaders Back Bush
Silence on Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A14.
286. Bush, 531 U.S at 103-04.
287. See supra notes 18, 24, 33-34 and accompanying text.
288. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See also Guinier, supra note 231, at 1093.
289. For a comprehensive explanation and in-depth analysis of election reforms enacted since
Election 2000 and reforms still needed, see Election Reform Information Project, Election.org,
at www.electionline.org (modified daily).
290. Id.
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election boards across the nation are scrutinizing their election proce-
dures to avoid any incidents resembling those experienced in 2000.29 1
Aside from voting mechanism improvements, the Election 2000 cri-
sis led to renewed discussions proffering ways to increase enfranchise-
ment and turnout.292 The proposals include initiatives such as on-site
same day voter registration, electronic voting, online voting, extended
voting hours, voting holidays, and voting by mail. 293 While Election
2000 provided a strong and stark impetus for change, in reality many
of the wide-eyed and optimistic initiatives for electoral reform are un-
291. ELECTION REFORM 2004, supra note 280, at 9, 25, 49.
Ever since Florida's 2000 election, issues surrounding voting machines have taken
center stage. HAVA [Help America Vote Act] paid particular attention to the subject,
requiring states to mandate several significant improvements to their voting systems.
As of January 1, 2006, every state must allow voters to verify their selections on the
ballot, notify them of over-votes and give voters the opportunity to correct or change
errors before casting their ballot. However, a voter education program training voters
how to examine their own ballots for errors can suffice, the law states. Machines must
produce a paper record to allow for a manual audit and all states must provide individ-
uals with disabilities, including the blind and visually impaired, equal access to cast an
independent and secret ballot through the use of at least one direct-recoding (DRE)
machine or other voting system at each polling place. Persons for whom English is a
second language must have access to alternative language ballots and all systems must
comply with the error-rate standard established by HAVA.
Under HAVA, individual states could take part in the $325 million optional buyout
program to replace or upgrade antiquated punch-card and lever machines, but partici-
pation was not mandatory. States that opted to forgo machine replacement were re-
quired to create a voter education program.
States that decided to participate in the buyout program were given the option to
apply for a waiver giving them until January 1, 2006 to make the replacements. Of
those 30 states, 24 applied for waivers.
Voting machine usage varies from state to state and county to county. Currently,
voters in most states cast ballots on a variety of machines including DRE, optical scan,
lever, paper and punch-card - however, 19 states plan to implement uniform systems by
2006.
Id. at 10, 12.
292. Many policy suggestions for increasing voter turnout were made, including mandatory
voting, rewarding voting with tax breaks or money, voting holidays, and closing bars, malls, and
movie theaters on election day. William Safire, For Turnout Turnabout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2002, at A23. Other states have opted for on-line voting and mail-in voting to add to the citi-
zens' alternatives for casting a ballot. Online Voting Approved for Michigan Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at A17.
293. See Miles Rapoport & Jason Tarricone, Election Reform's Next Phase: A Broad Democ-
racy Agenda and the Need for A Movement, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'V 379 (2002)
(arguing that what is needed is a broad agenda of reforms implemented at the state level to
lower barriers to voting at every step, specifically: implementation of election day voter registra-
tion, restoration of voting rights to former felons, and development of comprehensive campaign
finance reform, including public financing of elections). See also Eben Moglen & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Soul of the New Political Machine: The Online, The Color Line and Electronic De-
mocracy, 34 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1089 (2001) (discussing the strengths and disadvantages of online
voting as to its potential impact on minority voting, political identity and participation, and the
dangers of pure majoritarianism that online voting presents).
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derfunded and have been trumped by other pressing national con-
cerns such as the war on terror and national security.2 94
B. Momentum for Change
With the dust of the Election 2000 debacle gradually fading from
the headlines, scholars and activists have moved onto other pressing
national concerns, such as attacks on civil liberties in the wake of Sep-
tember 11th, international and domestic terrorism, war in Iraq, and
other looming domestic crises, such as the economy, health care costs,
and education. 295 However, thoughtful review of the Court's decision
in Bush v. Gore points to a window for change. While the Court tried
to narrowly couch its opinion in Bush v. Gore to the bizarre context of
the Supreme Court deciding a presidential election, its words have al-
ready been applied by lower courts presiding over similar ballot box
disenfranchisement cases.296
If new life can be infused into the Voting Rights Act as it nears its
fortieth anniversary, then its noble goal of universal enfranchisement
may be realized. Of course Voting Rights Act litigation must be re-
294. Edward Walsh, Enthusiasm Wanes for Election Changes; Bush, Hill Slow on Funds, Com-
mission, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2003, at A9. The Bush Administration has been slow to provide
the funding promised for election reform. Id. While not surprising to some skeptical observers,
the states have fulfilled their obligation for updating voting machines and election technology
while the federal government has been dragging its feet. Id. "'The states are really walking
alone on the road to reform,' said Doug Chapin, director of the Election Reform Information
Project, which tracks developments in the field. 'The states have really moved forward on their
end of the bargain, but the federal government has yet to do that."' Id. Congress enacted re-
form legislation, the "Help America Vote Act" (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2002) in response to
the Election 2000 debacle. In passing the legislation, Congress immediately allocated $650 mil-
lion to the states, most of which was going to replace punch-card and other arcane voting equip-
ment with modern electronic machines. Id. While HAVA authorizes $1 billion for election
reform, both the House and Senate versions of their appropriations bills included only $500
million for election reform. Id. For a full and bipartisan examination of electoral reform since
Election 2000, see ELECTION REFORM 2004, supra note 280.
295. In the years since the Election 2000 chaos, numerous other pressing concerns have filled
our headlines. Beginning with the terrorist strikes on American soil on September 11, 2001, the
United States entered into the war on terror. During the ensuing months, President George W.
Bush enjoyed unheard of approval ratings and served as a Commander-in-Chief with a mandate.
See Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, A Nation Challenged The Poll; Survey Shows Doubts Stir-
ring on Terror War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al. The only problem is that he did not win
Election 2000 with a mandate, thus his decisions have led numerous commentators, scholars and
citizens to wonder how a president elected with a minority of the vote can so drastically effectu-
ate sweeping and destructive changes in foreign policy, domestic affairs, civil liberties, and eco-
nomic programs. See, e.g., Susan Sontag, Real Battles and Empty Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2002, at A25; Elisabeth Bumiller & David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Dealing with the
Crisis; Taking Command in Crisis, Bush Wields New Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al. See
also Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, Remarks at the Third Annual Ultimate Women's Power
Lunch (Apr. 30, 2004) (transcript on file with DePaul Law Review and author).
296. See supra notes 156, 221, 225 and accompanying text.
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framed in order to accomplish such aspirations. 297 Thus, strategies for
litigation must draw on the analysis of the Court both in its Bush v.
Gore decision and in its constitutional underpinnings. However, the
widely challenged logic and analysis of the Court's opinion poses a
quandary for the Court's Bush v. Gore majority, the scholars who de-
fend it, and the activists who hope to capitalize on it.
The only roadblock to such an extension of jurisprudence could be
the Court's ability to declare Bush v. Gore an abberation of fact-spe-
cific judicial reasoning. In essence, if the Rehnquist Court follows its
Bush v. Gore analysis to future voting rights cases deriving from Elec-
tion 2000, or facts compellingly on all fours with the voting discrepan-
cies in Bush, the Rehnquist Court will reluctantly expand the group
rights of minority citizens. If, on the other hand, the Rehnquist Court
retreats to its much-proffered jurisprudence of trumping group or mi-
nority rights with individual rights in future voting rights cases, then it
will vindicate itself to the states' rights proponents, yet severely dam-
age its own legitimacy.
Since the Court and its defenders swear that the opinion was not
dependant upon outcome determinative reasoning, it seems they
would fully embrace the tenets of equal protection to the fundamental
right to vote as applied to the ballot box. If the Court is faced with an
appeal of such a decision and necessarily holds that Bush v. Gore does
not apply because it was so fact-specific, then the dilemma the Court
would face would indeed be the illegitimacy that haunted the Court in
the aftermath of its decision in Bush v. Gore.
V. CONCLUSION: THERE ARE STILL MANY MOUNTAINS TO CLIMB
In some circles, the Voting Rights Act has been rendered a time-
piece,298 a remedy for past injuries, and an illustration of bandages
seeking to repair America's ugly voting history. Given the trend of
Voting Rights Act litigation towards creating racially representative
districts, 299 and the litigation's steady decline of success before the
current individual rights-based Supreme Court, it is no wonder the
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act has been marginalized. 3°°
However unwittingly, the Supreme Court has added new life into
the fatigued legislation in the form of its Bush v. Gore decision. While
297. See supra Part III.
298. See Jeffrey D. McMillen, Note, The Effects of the Voting Rights Act. A Case Study, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 725, 753 (1994).
299. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny, including: Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952 (1996); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 542 (1999); Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. 977 (2000).
300. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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cautiously drafted to fit the unique circumstances of the presidential
election fracas, the Court's reasoning has already echoed in the lower
courts interpreting the decision.30 1 With lower courts interpreting
Bush v. Gore to apply to the claims of unequally counted votes within
local municipalities, the Supreme Court soon may need to address its
Bush v. Gore decision and its lack of grounding in precedent. 302
With strategic analysis and careful advocacy, civil rights advocates
can turn what appeared to be a significant blow to voting rights (in
that thousand of voters were actually disenfranchised by the Court's
opinion) into an incredible catalyst for mobilization and greater en-
franchisement. Simply by applying the Court's rationale under a fun-
damental rights strand, triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, individuals can demand equal access and equal
counting of their right to vote. The parallel claim vindicates not only
the fundamental rights of each voter as an individual, but also of racial
minorities, the group that the Voting Rights Act was meant to protect.
Such analysis also provides a revival of sorts for section 2, a clause
that has been monopolized by redistricting and recently unsuccessful
voter dilution cases.
Currently, great variations in voting technology exist along geo-
graphic lines depending on the arbitrary decision of the local election
board in procuring its voting mechanisms. 30 3 Meanwhile, it seems
there are no compelling state interests for allowing wide discrepancies
in voting equipment with such grave differences in voting success.
The Court's requirement of a compelling state interest for the vari-
ance in voting procedures makes it increasingly possible that voters
can challenge the voting systems in their municipality if the chosen
system has a higher error rate than a nearby town.
In an interesting celebration for the fortieth anniversary of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, it seems that Bush v. Gore ironically breathes new life
into the civil rights era legislation. By unwittingly giving the Voting
Rights Act a fourth generation strategy of litigation in Bush v. Gore,
the Supreme Court has proven that the Voting Rights Act, while far
from being over the hill, is also far from dead.
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